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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Speech on INF

Attached is a first draft for consideration at the 0900 meeting Saturday, March 26 in OEOB Room 305. Mr. Peter Rodman, the drafter, will provide extra copies at that time.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By Cid NARA, Date 9/25/07

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Last week I spoke to the American people on radio and television about my Administration's programs for national defense -- about our plans for safeguarding this nation's security and that of our allies. And I announced the long-term effort that this country will undertake in scientific research to counter, some day, the menace of offensive nuclear missiles.

Today I would like to discuss with you the broader context of national security. National defense is one part -- certainly a fundamental part -- of any nation's policy for ensuring its safety. Arms control -- the effort to limit or control or reduce the danger of modern weaponry -- is another crucial part of our national security policy. Both of these go hand in hand with our diplomacy, which strives to advance the cause of freedom and to create the conditions in which conflicts and disagreements, where they occur, are settled by political and not military means.

Throughout history, rivalries between nations have often led to war. The emergence of a new major power with global ambitions has usually produced a coalition of nations against it; often this has ended in a test of strength.

The problem of peace in the modern period is one of unprecedented complexity. We live in a world of

thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, a world in which a total war would mean catastrophe. We also live in a world torn by a great moral struggle -- between democracy and its enemies, between the spirit of freedom and those who fear it. The Soviet Union has engaged, in the last 20 years, in a relentless military buildup, overtaking and surpassing the United States in several categories of military power, and acquiring what can only be considered an offensive military capability. All the moral values which this country cherishes -- freedom; democracy; the right of peoples and nations to determine their own destiny, to speak and write and live and worship as they choose -- are fundamentally challenged by a powerful nation and system which do not wish them to survive.

So this is our dilemma, and it is a profound one: We must manage this conflict while avoiding nuclear war. We must defend and advance our values without inviting holocaust. We must maintain the peace without betraying our principles or our friends.

There is no escape from this dual responsibility of avoiding war and defending freedom. We cannot conduct ourselves in the world as if the special danger of nuclear weapons had not yet been invented. We cannot leap to the ignominious -- and false -- conclusion that preemptive capitulation is the only recourse open to us. Either course is an intellectual evasion as well as an abdication of our moral duty.

This is the legacy that history has bequeathed to us. We of the 20th Century, who are often so proud of our achievements in mastering the forces of nature, are forced, almost as punishment for the sin of pride, to wrestle for the rest of our lives with one of the most complex moral challenges ever faced by any generation.

You know my views about the Soviet Union and what it represents. You know my program for maintaining, strengthening, and modernizing our national defense. Let me tell you, today, something about what I am doing on another front of our national security policy -- reducing the danger of nuclear war by reducing or eliminating the nuclear arsenals which threaten it.

The American Record

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the leader in the international effort to negotiate nuclear arms limitations. In 1946, when the United States was still the only country in the world possessing these awesome weapons, we did not blackmail others with threats to use them; we did not use our enormous power to conquer territory, to advance our position or to seek to dominate. Instead we submitted a

proposal -- the Baruch plan -- for international control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union. In 1955, President Eisenhower presented his "open skies" proposal, according to which the United States and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and permitted aerial reconnaissance to ensure against the danger of surprise attack. This proposal, too, was rejected by the Soviet Union.

Since then, some agreements have been reached -- always at American initiative: The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which bans nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water; the agreement to establish the "hot line" in 1963, upgraded in 1971, for direct communications to avoid miscalculation during a crisis; the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1968, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; the agreement in 1971 on procedures of communication to safeguard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; the seabed arms control treaty of 1971, which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed or the ocean floor; the strategic arms limitation agreements of 1972, which imposed limits on anti-ballistic missile systems and on numbers of strategic offensive missiles; and the 1972 convention banning the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons.

Throughout all this period, it was the United States which took the initiative to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to reduce the dangers of war. While many agreements were reached, we have suffered many disappointments. The American people have hoped, by these measures, to mitigate tensions and start to build a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. But we have seen Soviet nuclear arsenals continue to grow. We have seen the Soviet Union projecting its power with an unprecedented global reach. We have seen resistance, on the Soviet Union's part, to more extensive and fundamental measures of arms control. And we have seen, I am obliged to say, occasional grounds for questioning whether the Soviet Union has been in total compliance with all the arms control agreements that have already been signed.

When I came into office, I had promised the American people two things: to restore our defenses, in order to strengthen our deterrence of war, but at the same time to pursue, with all my energy, the essential goal of negotiating reliable agreements to reduce nuclear weapons. I am keeping both these promises.

The defense programs I have submitted to the Congress reflect my best judgment, and the best judgment of the military experts and defense analysts of our government, of what is

absolutely essential to make up for the lost years when crucial investment in defense programs was disparaged or neglected. Winston Churchill referred to those years in the 1930's when British defense spending was allowed to lag as "the years the locusts have eaten." When the great challenge came, these lost years could not be retrieved. The democracies paid a terrible price, for their military weakness had only tempted aggression.

Today, not only the peace but also the chances for real arms control depend on restoring the military balance. Soviet ideology does not permit Soviet leaders to leave any Western weakness unprobed, any vacuum of power unfilled. And in a negotiation they give no concessions free. Soviet leaders, whose doctrine sees negotiation as only another form of struggle, will make concessions or reduce their arsenals only if they see it as absolutely necessary. Only if they see the West determined to modernize its own military forces will they see an incentive to negotiate an agreement establishing equal, lower levels.

Therefore, conscious of my responsibility before future generations, and on the firm foundation of our rebuilt defensive strength, I ordered my Administration when it came into office to take a fresh look at the entire arms control agenda. Since then, in coordination with our allies, I have

undertaken the most comprehensive program of arms control initiatives ever undertaken by an American President. Never before in our history has this nation been engaged in so many simultaneous efforts to limit and reduce the instruments of war:

- Most recently, the United States has tabled a proposal in Geneva, at the 40-Nation Committee on Disarmament, for a total ban on chemical weapons.
- Last summer, together with our NATO allies, we offered a comprehensive new proposal in Vienna for the mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe.
- In Berlin last June, I proposed to the Soviet Union a set of measures for pre-notification of ballistic-missile test launches and major exercises, and an expanded exchange of information in connection with limits on both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces.
- And in those two most important arms control negotiations now going on, which I will discuss further in a moment, I have made far-reaching proposals for deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals and for elimination of the entire class of intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

In all these negotiations certain basic principles guide our policy:

- First, we insist that arms control agreements be equal and balanced, because an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression. The goal of arms control is to enhance security, not insecurity.
- Second, arms control is not an end in itself but a component of a broad policy designed to enhance stability, reduce the chances of miscalculation in a crisis, and address those kinds of weapons that pose the most danger of surprise attack.
- Third, arms control should seek significant reductions on both sides. Previous strategic arms control agreements have essentially codified existing balances. Today, for the first time, we are engaged in active negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce the most powerful strategic weapons on both sides.
- Fourth, arms control agreements must be verifiable. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which makes arms control so important, also means that agreements cannot be founded on simple trust. We -- and the Soviets -- are realists. We know that such agreements can survive only if there is adequate assurance of compliance.

It is with these principles in mind, and with the highest priority, that my Administration has approached the negotiation on the most powerful weapons in the American and Soviet arsenals -- strategic nuclear weapons.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

In June of 1982, American and Soviet negotiators convened in Geneva to begin what we call the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START. We have sought to work out an agreement reducing the levels of strategic weapons on both sides. I proposed to the Soviets that we reduce the number of nuclear missiles by one-half and nuclear warheads by one-third. No more than half the remaining warheads could be on land-based missiles. Both sides would be left with equal and lower levels of forces.

This proposal would not only reduce numbers; it would also put specific limits on precisely those types and characteristics of nuclear weapons that pose the most danger of an outbreak of nuclear war -- the types and characteristics most destabilizing in a crisis and most conducive to a first strike or surprise attack. These are the land-based intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBMs), with their accurate multiple warheads, which on the Soviet side are capable of eliminating the American land-based ICBM force in a preemptive first strike.

We have also proposed limits on strategic bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles on both sides.

Our proposal would provide ample security for both the Soviet Union and the United States. It is a major advance beyond the previous SALT process in that it reduces nuclear arsenals instead of just ratifying the existing balance; it reduces missiles and warheads instead of only missile launchers; and it reduces the most destabilizing weapons instead of addressing only aggregate totals.

The Soviet Union has responded to our proposal with its own proposal including deep reductions. There are many problems with the Soviets' proposal -- they have not yet responded adequately to serious concerns we have raised about it -- but it is important that they have now accepted the concept of deep reductions which they rejected when it was proposed by President Carter in 1977. Even their proposal would reduce their forces and ours by some 450 missiles below what was agreed to in SALT II. This negotiation is proceeding in a

serious manner, under the able leadership of Ambassador Edward Rowny on the American side. Solid progress has been made. I am confident that a successful outcome is possible. I pledge to you every effort to bring it about.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

We are also engaged with the Soviet Union in talks in Geneva on reducing or eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) which are deployed or intended to be deployed in Europe.

In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union began to deploy on its own territory and in Eastern Europe a new class of missile unlike any that had ever before been seen in Europe. This was the so-called SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missile, each with three highly accurate nuclear warheads, of a range capable of destroying cities and military bases anywhere in Western Europe, launched from distances in most cases far beyond the range of any of NATO's weapons based in Western Europe.

NATO, as I said, had no comparable weapon. Our forward-based aircraft, some of which could reach the Soviet Union, were bound to come up against the Soviet Union's continually-upgraded and modernized anti-aircraft defenses. Nor did NATO in any way provoke this new, unprecedented

escalation. Indeed, in the period of the Soviet deployments of SS-20's, NATO withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe.

This major shift in the European military balance prompted our West European allies themselves to propose that NATO find some means of righting the balance. In December 1979, all the members of the Alliance agreed on a collective decision which had two tracks:

-- First, the United States was asked by its allies to deploy in Western Europe 572 land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The purpose was to counterbalance, offset, and deter the Soviet SS-20's which were already in 1979 being deployed at a rapid rate. The first NATO weapons were to be ready for deployment in late 1983. The broader purpose was to deter any Soviet attack on Europe by guaranteeing that the strategic nuclear deterrent of the United States was coupled inextricably to the security of Western Europe.

-- Secondly, the NATO allies also agreed in 1979 to negotiate with the Soviet Union on mutual limitations on these intermediate-range missiles -- to explore if negotiated mutual restraint in deployment could spare Europe another arms race.

In furtherance of this goal of a negotiated limit on these weapons, I announced in November of 1981 that the United States would propose a total ban on such weapons, to eliminate this entire class of weapons from the face of the earth. The Soviet Union has refused this proposal; it has continued to deploy new SS-20 missiles at the rate of _____ a week. It has launched a propaganda offensive to generate public pressures in the West to block the American deployment, which is still in the future, even while the Soviet weapons continue to grow in number -- reaching the total of 320(?) at the present time. The Soviets have made a counterproposal insisting that the United States be limited to zero, while the Soviets come down to 162. Well, 162 to zero is not much better than 320 to zero.

I have made clear that our own proposals were not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. And we have been willing to consider any Soviet proposal consistent with four principles.

These are:

- An agreement, to be fair, must establish equal numbers for both Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear forces.
- British and French nuclear forces are independent and are not part of the subject matter of the US-Soviet INF negotiations.

- We will not sign an agreement that permits the Soviet Union merely to shift SS-20's from European targets to Asian targets. We will not try to improve European security at the expense of our allies and friends in Asia. We insist that any Soviet weapons to be reduced must be dismantled.
- And fourth, a fair agreement must contain effective procedures for verification, and it must not undermine NATO's ability to defend itself by conventional forces.

Over the last several months, we have been consulting closely with our Atlantic allies. They strongly endorse these principles. They -- and we -- agree that it is time to make clear to the world that we are willing to go the extra mile. Therefore, earlier this week I authorized my negotiator in Geneva, Ambassador Paul Nitze, to present a new American proposal.

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The Western Alliance has not abandoned its goal of eliminating all these weapons from Europe. Nor have we abandoned our conviction that if Soviet policies do not permit a balanced and equitable agreement, the West has no choice but to proceed with deployment to achieve a military balance by

these means. It may well be the case that the Soviet leaders will not negotiate seriously until they see NATO about to deploy its own INF systems. Therefore, we must be prepared to proceed if necessary -- and this offers the best chance for a good agreement. The United States will listen to any serious proposal and will be ready at any time -- even after deployment begins -- to negotiate an equitable agreement.

The Nuclear Freeze

This is the arms control agenda on which my Administration has been vigorously negotiating. Our proposals are fair, far-reaching, and comprehensive. We have made progress, but there is much distance still to travel.

Americans are an impatient people. It is a symptom of our traditional optimism, energy, and spirit. Often this is a source of strength. In a negotiation, however, it is more often a handicap. Any of you who have been involved in labor-management negotiations, or any kind of bargaining, know that patience is a sign of determination; it strengthens one's bargaining position. If one side seems too eager or desperate, the other side has no incentive to make a concession and every incentive to hold back concessions, expecting that the more eager side will cave in first.

This is human nature; it is a fact of life. You know this from your own experience. It is most certainly true when dealing with the Soviet Union. Generosity in negotiation has never been a characteristic of Soviet leaders; it runs counter to the most basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

It is vital, therefore, that we show patience, determination, and above all national unity. If we are a divided people, and if the Soviets know that pressures against the United States Government will always force changes in our position, then the Soviets will hold fast. The result is to postpone an agreement, not hasten it.

This is why I have been so concerned about the so-called nuclear freeze proposals, one of which is being considered at this time by the House of Representatives. Most of those who support the freeze are well-intentioned, honest fellow citizens concerned about the arms race and the danger of nuclear war. I can tell you I share this concern. I can also tell you that these freeze proposals, however well-intentioned they are, could turn out to do more harm than good.

Certainly it's a simple solution -- but it should be clear that a simple solution to a complex problem never works. As H.L. Mencken once said, "For every complex problem, there exists a solution that is simple, appealing, and wrong!"

- A freeze would preserve today's high, unequal, and unstable levels of nuclear forces.
- It would raise enormously complicated problems of deciding what is covered by the freeze, what kinds of modernization are permitted, and how to verify what is permitted -- extremely complicated issues that are either already being dealt with in START or are harder than those dealt with in START. And START, in contrast, would produce reductions in the levels on both sides, not just freeze them. Attempting to negotiate a freeze would only delay the negotiations now going on that promise significant reductions.
- The freeze proposal, furthermore, would be a lot less harmful if ^a similar grass-roots popular movement against nuclear weapons were putting similar pressures on Yuri Andropov. As Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, put it in a Washington Post article criticizing the nuclear freeze proposal: "Its effect is to put pressure on the United States, but not on the Soviet Union."
- Finally, the freeze would lock us in to our existing equipment which in many cases is obsolescent and badly in need of modernization. Three-quarters of Soviet strategic systems are less than 5 years old; three-quarters of American strategic systems are more than 15 years old.

To our allies in the great democracies of the Atlantic Community and Japan, I want to say this: We will consult closely with you at every stage. We consider it a heavy responsibility to be negotiating with our adversaries over issues of such direct concern to you, your safety and your well-being. We will not sacrifice your security or miss opportunities to ensure greater security through arms control.

And to the leaders and people of the Soviet Union, I say: Join us on the noble path of preventing war and reducing armaments. Let us vie in the realm of ideas, on the field of peaceful competition. Let history record that we tested our theories through human experience, not that we destroyed ourselves in the name of vindicating our way of life. Let us practice restraint in our international conduct, so that the present climate of mistrust can some day give way to some mutual confidence and a secure peace.

This is the goal of all Americans, of all the democratic nations. If the Soviet Union responds in the same spirit, we will be ready.

S/P:PRodman

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