CITAIDEL

DECLASSIFIED | RELEASED NLS F00-147# 1380

BY __ LOT_ NARA, DATE 6/23/06

--OUR PURPOSE TODAY IS TO CONSIDER NEXT STEPS ON THE PRIVATE INF PROPOSAL DISCUSSED BETWEEN PAUL NITZE AND KVITSINSKY IN GENEVA AT THE CLOSE OF THE LAST ROUND.

--THE PRESIDENT REVIEWED THE PROPOSAL AND ASKED FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE OUTCOME IMPLIED BY THE PROPOSAL.

--BOTH CAP AND THE JCS APPARENTLY FEEL THAT THE PRECISE TERMS OF THE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST.

-- IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE HAVE THREE CHOICES TODAY

- O REJECT THE PROPOSAL AND DISCONTINUE THE CHANNEL
- o REJECT THE PROPOSAL BUT ADOPT IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION
 in the NORMAL FULL DELEGATION FRAMEWORK

O ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL

TO BEGIN WITH, CAP, COULD YOU AND JACK VESSEY EXPALIN BRIEFLY
WHY YOU DO NOT BELLEVE THIS IS AN ADEQUATE PROPOSAL?

30 dora

- (AFTER DEFENSE STATEMENT) CAP COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHY YOU BELIEVE

 WE WOULD BE WORSE OFF WITH THIS PROPOSAL THAN WITH THE STRAIGHT DEPLOYMENT

 OF OUR 572 MISSILES WITH NO AGREEMENT AT ALL?
 - --GEORGE--WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS?
 - -- (AFTER SHULTZ, ASK FOR ROSTOW AND NITZE VIEWS, AS WELL AS BILL CASEY'S)
- THE CONSENSUSAPPEARS TO BE THAT WHILE THIS IS NOT THE BEST SOLUTION,


 IT IS GOOD ENOUGH TO BE WORTH NEGOTIATION. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHAT IS PENDIN II IN A REQUIRED IS SOME PROMPT ANALYSIS OF EXACTLY WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IN

 THE WAY OF MODIFICATIONS.

--AFTER WE HAVE THAT--AND WE NEED IT THIS WEEK--WE OUGHT TO BE CLEAR ON JOAN HOW WE CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. I PERSONALLY DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN KEEP THIS PRIVATE. THUS IT MUST BE BRIEFED TO OUR ALLIES AND HANDLED IN THE NORMAL CHANNELS.

-- (ASK FOR ANY FURTHER COMMENT ON THE BUREAUCRATIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR HANDLING IT). MR PRESIDENT, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS UNDER SUBMISSION AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO THE COMMUNITY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

[Nesser



TALKING POINTS

- The way we conduct the INF negotiations will directly affect the security and cohesion of the NATO alliance, and our ability to go forward with our planned deployments of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II next year. Our conduct of the INF negotiations is also important to the success of our overall arms control policy and our defense program.
- -- We have arrived at this point by a rather unorthodox route, but my understanding is that no commitments have been made on behalf of the US Government, and all options remain open to us.
- -- The President has read the memo I sent him last week, which was based on your inputs. It seems to me that your materials laid out the issues fairly and concisely. The purpose of our meeting today is to decide how to proceed -- whether to pursue such a package as a possible solution, or decide now to reject it.
- There seem to be three central questions here. First, is the military balance that would result from the package acceptable to the United States? Arguments are made in your materials that the Soviets would have an edge because their SS-20's would have advantages over US GLCMs, and on the other side that the balance is more favorable to the US under the package than if we go ahead with our full program with no agreement. We should get to the bottom of

SECRET/SENSITIVE DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

this question today.

SECRET BY NARA, DATE 6/23/06


- -- The second question, it seems to me, is what we can expect will happen next year if we hold to our current position.

 Our zero/zero approach currently has broad support. Looking ahead to next year, I'd like to hear from CIA and State on the situation we can anticipate in Europe when the missiles begin to arrive next spring if the talks are deadlocked.

 What are the prospects for our deployment plans?
- -- The final question is how an agreement along the lines of the package would affect the situation in Europe, and our deployment plans in particular.
- But I would just like to clarify one point before we get started. It is my understanding that we have as yet no reading of the Soviet attitude toward the package. We may get one when Paul Nitze sees Kvitsinskiy or when George Shultz sees Gromyko later this month, but we have nothing yet. So it seems to me we really have three choices -- we can pursue this approach and possible variations as a potential solution, we can decide now to reject it, or we can defer a final decision until we see what the Soviet response is.
- -- Let us begin with the question of the military balance -the balance under the package and the balance without an
 agreement. This question is very much on the mind of the

(Seek views of Secretary Weinberger and JCS, and also Secretary Shultz and Professor Rostow. Try to get

SECRET /SENSITIVE




DoD to address not simply the value of the PII in isolation, but to weigh the benefits of the planned PII deployments vs. advantages of the reductions of SS-20s under the package. The objective is to determine for the President whether the Chiefs can, in the end, support such a package or variations on it as an outcome. After sufficient discussion to make such a determination, move on to the next question.)

-- Let us turn now to the question of what situation we can anticipate in Europe next year when the PIIs and GLCMs show up assuming the talks are deadlocked and we are holding out for zero/zero. I would like to hear first from CIA, then the State Department and others.

(The key question is, will we be able to go forward with our deployments as planned? If the answer is "yes," then we are in a strong position. If the answer is "no" or "we don't know," then we should look hard at our INF negotiating approach to see what course of action will maximize support for our deployment program. When you have heard enough to report to the President the prospects for next year if we hold to our position, move on to the next question.)

SECRET /SENSITIVE



The final question I would like to address is how pursuing such a package, or an agreement based on such a package, would change the prospects for our deployments. An aspect of this question that has been raised in some of the materials is the possible advantage to the US of exploration of such an approach even if it does not lead to an agreement. It would like to hear your views on that as well.

(Seek views of each principal. The objective is to determine how a package solution, or willingness to pursue a package solution even if ultimately unsuccessful, could advance US interests, particularly INF deployments.)

- -- [As the meeting draws to an end you could, depending on how the discussion has gone, suggest a consensus that we defer a decision until we see a Soviet reaction, or simply say that you will report this issue to the President and object his decision;] while he thinks about it.]
- The meeting will almost certainly not result in a recommendation either to pursue or reject the package. In the unlikely case that there is an agreed recommendation, you could proceed to the next steps. If we decide to pursue the package, the next step would be to request an interagency study for the NSPG that would address possible changes to the package, verification, the appropriate channel to pursue negotiations on the package, when and

SHORET/SENGTHIVE

SECRET

how to inform the allies, when and how to inform the Congress, etc. If we decide to reject the package, the next step would be to decide when and how to inform the Soviets.