

### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

# SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM TO: THE SECRETARY

FROM: Al

ARA - Tom Enders

SUBJECT: Your meeting with the President, April 20

#### CHECKLIST

o Argentine position both very tough and very hard to establish. Some 50 military, including corps commanders, involved in decision making. Military kept jerking diplomats back. Believe I have got as close to Argentine bottom line as is possible this week.

# o What we got:

- -- arrangements or language tilting towards Argentina on the two main questions (future negotiations and local administration), but
- -- a British veto on both so that London could control the pace of future change.
- o As expected, London can't and won't go that far, and we shouldn't in any way push them at this point. As you saw, my message to Pym was neutral.
- o Now comes the delicate part of the problem.
  - -- military pressures are rising (Britain may debark on South Georgia tomorrow);
  - -- British will step up pressure on us to back them openly;
  - -- Argentina will start Rio Treaty gambit and try (probably successfully) to get wide Latin support for its position (we doubt that Argentina will try for sanctions under the Rio Treaty now -- or that it could get them).

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BY LOJ NARA DATE 1/28/08

- o We need to identify the British bottom line, just as we are close to Argentina's. That is the reason for asking Pym to come over this week.
- o Meanwhile, suggest we keep to a neutral press line: we've been identifying respective positions but not characterizing.
- o This game is excruciatingly difficult and may well be impossible to win. But every time I recalculate the cost to us of war in the South Atlantic, I cannot avoid concluding that we would be a major loser, on both continents.