

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508ACTION

September 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: CLARK A. MURDOCK

SUBJECT: Pat Buchanan's Proposed Reagan Plan for
Southern Africa

Mr. Buchanan is absolutely correct, in my judgment, that the President must move beyond the "current sterile 'sanctions' debate" in order to regain support for his leadership. (See Tab I for Buchanan's proposal). I also believe there is considerable merit in trying to broaden the field of vision to all of southern Africa, not just the internal South African issue which is likely to remain gridlocked for at least the next few months while white and black South Africans alike internalize the application of sanctions. I think our current strategy goes pretty far in this direction and does stand some chance of restoring Presidential initiative and sustaining a veto. Our approach now encompasses the following elements:

-- Diplomatic initiatives: Ambassadorial announcement, Shultz visit.

-- Expanded executive order: Includes the EC measures (which will not include coal if the German counsellor's confidence is not misplaced) and portions of the original Lugar bill.

-- Regional Economic Assistance Initiative: State has proposed a five-year, \$100 million per year, regional plan heavily geared toward transportation; expanded positive programs aimed at South African blacks (in FY 86, we spent \$5 million and the Senate bill mandates much more).

-- Strong Presidential speech aimed at moving the issue beyond the current preoccupation with sanctions, emphasizing U.S. objectives for a post-apartheid southern Africa, and our positive commitment to the region (programs targeted at black Africans, willingness to facilitate negotiations, etc.)

Mr. Buchanan's proposal obviously goes much further than our current thinking, including an ambitious diplomatic effort to address simultaneously regional conflicts (declaring cease-fires in place throughout southern Africa, legalizing all dissident movements that renounce violence, releasing all political prisoners, lifting all sanctions, and convening an American-African summit) and a \$10 billion multilateral economic assistance program. I think we all support the ends toward which this initiative is aimed -- and indeed should incorporate them

into the President's speech, as many of them were in his last speech -- but I believe the initial impact of such a speech would be skeptical. Critics would argue that the President is trying to duck the critical South African question -- namely, fostering good-faith negotiations between black and white South Africans -- by subsuming it into the region's whole host of problems, many of which appear quite intractable in the short term and unlikely to be resolved by the Buchanan approach. I also believe that if we hastily put together an initiative of this magnitude, particularly without Allied consultation and realistic financial commitments, that it would not be viewed as genuine, but as an attempt to sustain a veto by making impractical promises. I think this feeling might be particularly strong on the Hill where many, including Senator Lugar, appear determined to commit the United States to concrete measures.

While I do not recommend the Buchanan proposal as a short-term approach, I personally share his belief that the United States and the West must take a more positive and affirmative approach to the crisis in southern Africa, one that holds out a vision of hope and promise and a process by which we can help the people of southern Africa get there. The recent obsession with sanctions, by contrast, focuses on punishing the parties for refusing to change. Once we are through the next few weeks, we should take advantage of the pause created by sanctions -- arguing that it takes time for the effect of sanctions to be felt -- and prepare an initiative on the scale of the Buchanan proposal for use when circumstances, both here in Washington and in southern Africa, are more propitious.

^{WR} Walt Raymond and Peter ^{MR} Rodman concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you share this memorandum with Mr. Buchanan and initiate preparation of a Reagan Plan for southern Africa.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo from Pat Buchanan


THE WHITE HOUSE

6576

WASHINGTON

September 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN
~~JOHN M. POINDEXTER~~

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN 
SUBJECT: THE REAGAN PLAN

While I yet believe we can prevail on the President's veto of South Africa sanctions, grinding it out day by day, hour by hour, to win votes, clearly, there is a need to supersede the "sanctions" embroglio and move the President onto the offensive. We need, I believe, to reshuffle the deck -- and deal ourselves an entirely new hand -- leaving our opposition sounding small and petty clamoring for sanctions against Pretoria, while the President is articulating a new vision for southern Africa. Here, then, is the first cut of a proposed "Reagan Plan."

First, the President points up that while we Americans may disagree on the efficacy of sanctions, we do agree about our broad national objectives, not only for South Africa, but for all the peoples of southern Africa. We Americans want the same things for the people of Luanda that we want for Lesotho. And what are those things?

- 1) Peace -- an end to violence, repression and civil war.
- 2) Economic Progress for all, black, white, Indian and colored.
- 3) Political Representation for all peoples.
- 4) Security and Self-determination for each independent state.

In South Africa, these goals are threatened by terrorism, repression and apartheid. But all over southern Africa they are also threatened -- by famine, economic stagnation, and bloody insurgencies and civil wars from Cabinda to the Cape. The President proposes a Reagan Plan for all southern Africa -- to include South Africa. What are its components?

- 1) A cease-fire in place, throughout Southern Africa, by all the warring elements: UNITA, SWAPO, RENAMO, and the ANC, and the four regimes they are opposing -- in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa.

2) The legalization of all dissident movements (ANC, SWAPO, UNITA and RENAMO) that renounce the use of terror and violence to achieve power, and accept a democratic process: i.e. a process that guarantees regular provisions for the legitimate transfer of power -- with full minority political and economic rights.

3) The withdrawal of all outside military forces from southern Africa within 12 months -- leaving behind a force in each country no larger than 600 trainers and advisers from any one nation, East or West. This would mean Cubans out of Angola; Tanzanians and Zimbabweans and Cubans out of Mozambique, South Africans out of Namibia, or at least reduced to 600, etc.

As foreign troops depart, the United States will undertake to terminate future military shipments to Savimbi; and South Africa will cut off shipments to UNITA and RENAMO; the Angolans would cease supplying SWAPO.

4) If the ANC agrees to renounce terror and violence, and participate in a democratic process in South Africa, South Africa would legalize the ANC. And the front-line states would take steps to end use of their territory as a base camp for assaults upon South Africa.

5) Once sanctuary is denied to guerrillas, by the Front-line States, South Africa would halt all cross-border operations, and formalize, by treaty with the U.S. and its neighbors, the right of the Front-line States to unimpeded rail and road access to and from South African ports. U.S. would undertake to see that Pretoria did not interfere with, or harass, peaceful commerce.

6) Immediate release of all political prisoners in South Africa, and the Front-line States -- as identified by Amnesty International or some other respected human rights agency. (Nelson Mandela would be released at the same time.)

7) The West and the UN would lift all economic sanctions against South Africa. (Whereupon, South Africa would lift all economic sanctions imposed against neighboring states.) A southern Africa customs union and Common Market would be created.

8) The United States, the World Bank, Japan and West Europe would then undertake a five-year, \$5 billion program to repair and open the Benguela, TanZam, Maputo and Beira rail lines -- and to improve the transportation infrastructure of an integrated southern African economy.

A second \$5 billion will be available in economic development loans and assistance to all those countries which committed themselves to guarantee:

- A) Freedom of speech and press -- sine qua non of representative government.

- B) Freedom of Worship.
 - C) Freedom from Want -- the individual's Right to own property, to keep the fruits of his labor. (Without economic freedom, foreign aid is ridiculous; that is a proven; besides, no U.S. Congress will vote to subsidize Marxism.)
 - D) Freedom From Fear -- i.e. an end to repression, and legalization of all non-violent and democratic movements and parties.
- 9) President would invite to an American-African summit in December all leaders of movements and nations -- including Sam Nujoma of SWAPO, Savimbi and Dos Santos of Angola, Kaunda of Zambia, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Botha, etc. -- who subscribe to The Reagan Plan. We might get South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Malawi, UNITA, RENAMO -- and perhaps Zambia or Tanzania. Those who refused -- Angola, Zimbabwe, SWAPO and probably Machel of Mozambique -- would appear to be against peace and democracy. We will have turned the chess board around.

Those who reject the invitation will have to explain why they are not attending. If they say Botha and his apartheid regime, we can respond that an end to the unjust system of apartheid is one of the very ends the President's summit seeks to bring about.

While this is a rude sketch of what a "Reagan Plan" might contain, it would of course have to be vetted and refined and altered. (What to do about Zaire, for example?) But the idea of transcending the current sterile "sanctions" debate, of moving the President above it, of broadening the field of vision so that the full horizon of southern Africa is brought in view, not simply the corner of South Africa, is an imperative -- for regaining support for the President's leadership. We cannot long succeed with such marginalia as a new black ambassador, and one or two more sanctions wedged into the EO.

HOW TO PROCEED

- A) Ascertain the President's interest in such an idea, if any.
- B) If it is there, we can work on a draft speech, incorporating the above ideas, and emendations agreed upon by State, etc.
- C) The Plan could either be a surprise Presidential speech on vetoing sanctions, or -- if we want to float it -- a Secretary of State speech, a la the Marshall Plan.
- D) Before the speech, vet it with London, Bonn, and especially Tokyo, who will have to chip in.

- E) Because such a speech would be saying yes, yes, yes to democracy in South Africa and southern Africa, and not simply no, no, no to sanctions against Pretoria, the immediate reception would be astonishment, surprise, and, I would think, broadly favorable comment (at least at first). As of now the President is known as the Western bulwark against sanctions; this would improve upon that narrow image by making the President the champion of the Four Freedoms in Africa, the one world leader who holds out hope and promise for the entire tortured region.
- F) All hell would break loose on the Marxist Left, because the Cubans ain't leaving; and the Communists in southern Africa want power, not desegregated lunch counters. But this would turn the tables and isolate them -- as we appear to be isolated now.
- G) Why not?

Our political problem, simply stated, is this: The American Left wants to be on the side of the "future," which they see as black and Red -- with us competing with the Soviets with aid and trade offers the Soviets cannot match. The Right wants us to stand up with the Boers and Buthezi and Savimbi and RENAMO. This Plan enables the President to stand -- above both -- on the high ground of Western values, principles and ideals for all the people of southern Africa, regardless of country or color.