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AGENDA

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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Situation Room
6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.
Friday, September 2, 1983

AIRLINER SHOOTDOWN

- I. Intelligence (5 minutes) William Casey
- A. Review of Events/Soviet Motivation
 - B. Soviet Reactions
 - C. Soviet Search and Rescue Operations
 - D. Soviet Forces in Area
- II. U.S./Allied Military Situation (5 minutes) Caspar Weinberger
General Vessey
- A. Regional Security Implications
 - B. Implications for Operations and Exercises
- III. Diplomatic Issues (15 minutes) George Shultz
- A. Implications for U.S./Soviet Relations
 - B. Coordination with Western Allies
 - C. Actions in United Nations
- IV. Discussion of Options (20 minutes) William Clark
- A. Bilateral U.S./Soviet
 - Sanctions
 - Diplomatic Measures
 - B. Multi-Lateral
- V. Public Diplomacy (10 minutes) William Clark
James Baker
- A. Legislative Strategy
 - B. Public Affairs Guidance
 - Domestic (Memorial service; possible Presidential involvement)
 - International (USIA/VOA)
- VI. Summary/Conclusion (5 minutes) ~~DECLASSIFIED~~ William Clark

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting: Soviet Shoot-Down of KAL Airliner

INTRODUCTION

The shooting down of a Korean airliner demands a serious international response. The scale of the tragedy is dramatic--surely one of the worst in civil aviation history.

The Soviets have a long history, beginning in 1946, of shooting down unarmed aircraft near their borders. Moreover, they have had a policy of electronic deception of radio air navigation aids which have lured many aircraft across their borders, only to be shot down. This is the second time they have shot down a Korean airliner.

Some will want to view this incident in a narrow context. However, it is worth considering whether the Soviets were deliberately seeking an opportunity to increase tensions in Asia in order--after events Lebanon, Chad, Central America--to test us in multiple theaters simultaneously. It is entirely likely that the decision to attack the airliner was made at a very high level.

It is therefore important that you focus the discussion at today's meeting on the broader ramifications of this incident. What does it say about how far the Soviets may now be prepared to go in trying to intimidate our Asian allies - who, like the Japanese, have shown some greater willingness to take new steps for effective defense - or our European allies on the verge of INF deployments? What does it say about the growing cynicism and boldness of the current Soviet leadership? And, based on the answer to this question, what does it say about the character and possibilities for our bilateral relationship in the immediate future?

The chief dilemma over the near term is how to translate the concern of the world into meaningful actions without making it appear that we are improperly capitalizing on the tragedy itself. How to devise measures that can be sustained? How to focus the existing rage in ways that enable us to influence domestic and

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international reaction of others on important issues before us; e.g., Soviet supported terrorism, use of chemical biological weapons, etc.

In past cases where the Soviets have committed egregious crimes they and their apologists have attempted through disinformation and lies to turn the focus away from their actions and somehow blame the U.S. or its allies. Unless we take the offensive they will try to put us on the defensive.

We need to think hard about an appropriate response, and we have to consider what message the Soviets may have tried to send as George Shultz prepares to meet next week with Gromyko in Madrid. If we decide that meeting should proceed, as George has announced, we need to consider very carefully the message we want to send.

OBJECTIVES

Your personal statement and early return have already set the tone of our concern. We must now ensure that follow on actions are directed and structured to achieve recognizable and coherent objectives. These objectives must be shared by the American people, the Congress, our major allies and reflect our status as leader of the free world. We believe that our actions in the coming days and weeks must be designed to achieve the following objectives:

- o Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register an Appropriate Political Protest. The incident presents us with the opportunity to reverse the false moral and political "peacemaker" perception that the Soviets have been cultivating. Their active propaganda in this regard has cast the Soviet Union as flexible, legitimate and searching for peace. This has, in turn, created severe problems in our efforts to convince the free world of their true objectives. Actions to achieve this objective should be aimed at securing domestic and international support for your programs to strengthen western security.
- o Justice. We must be seen as a leader (but not alone) in the international community in calling for justice. Civilized societies demand punishment and restitution. In order to deter and raise perceived costs of future egregious acts.

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Despite numerous incidents of this kind, the soviets have never acceptably investigated, reported or identified their victims. We must demand that they do so now. In order to be effective, the action we take to achieve this objective must be tailored to appear proportional to the crime. We cannot be perceived as too harsh, too weak or ineffective in the sanctions we call for or endorse.

- o Bolster the confidence of Intimidated States. What we do or fail to do in supporting the Koreans and Japanese in the days and weeks ahead will be a telling signal to friends and allies alike. We must be responsive and cooperative, without appearing excessive, particularly in the case of military support.

ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES

- o Actions to Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register Political Protest.

- A major Presidential speech addressing the objectives and methods of Soviet grand strategy.
- Review the degree to which our presence at negotiating tables with the Soviets reinforces the idea that the Soviets are good-faith negotiators. Consider withdrawal from various or all negotiations.
- Diplomatic effort to secure public statements and resolutions condemning the Soviet Union in relevant international fora.
- Major information campaign by USIA.
- Consider cancelling the forthcoming Shultz-Gromyko meeting. Such a meeting could be boycotted until the Soviets provide an explanation for the incident, an apology and reparations.
- Consider closing the Soviet consulate in San Francisco; it is a center for their spy network against the U.S. electronics industry.

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o Actions to secure justice.

- Soviets grant unimpeded Western access to crash site.
- Soviets publicly document to world-wide aviation bodies their procedures in the case of airliners crossing into Soviet airspace.
- Soviets provide specific assurances against destructive force being used again against straying airliners.
- Consider seizure or attachment of Soviet owned commercial assets in the U.S. in connection with filing an international claim against the USSR on behalf of American citizen victims.
- Soviets document that no future incidents of electronic desecration of radio air navigation signals will occur.
- Soviets must provide full reparations to Korea and to the families of the dead on accepted international scales.
- Options should be prepared concerning internationally implementable procedures to impede Aeroflot activities, world-wide, and discourage flights to the Soviet Union for a specified period of time.
- Review all outstanding U.S., allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry and seek immediate agreement from as many countries as possible to terminate or suspend indefinitely these deliveries.

o Actions to Bolster Confidence of Intimidated States

- Lease or sell AWACS to Japan to help defend regional air routes.
- Possible acceleration of F-16 deployment in Japan.
- Carrier battle group deployment to the region.
- Discussions with allies in the area to bolster regional security arrangements.

The NSPG meeting tonight will be too brief to discuss all of these matters. This paper, however, provides you with some thoughts to guide the discussion. Most importantly, in whatever we decide to do or not to do, we should keep these objectives in mind.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTONSYSTEM II  
91042

September 1, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: U.S. Response to Soviet Attack on Korean  
Airliner: Current Status and Next Steps

As you return for Saturday's NSC meeting, I want to review for you the situation with regard to the Korean airliner and the next steps we are working on for your consideration.

The Current Situation

The Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian aircraft resulting in the deaths of two hundred sixty-nine people, including approximately thirty-five Americans, was a callous and brutal act that is certain to have far-reaching international impact. It is obvious that our own bilateral relations with the Soviet Union cannot remain unaffected by a fresh and particularly irresponsible Soviet resort to force and violence. Indeed, we have already taken some unilateral punitive steps, and we will need to consider other possibilities in the days and weeks ahead. At the same time, we must also ensure that the Soviets pay the full political costs of their actions in ways which go well beyond the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. Thus, it is essential that we work to build and sustain the broadest possible international response to this appalling act.

Twenty-four hours after the Korean aircraft was shot down there remain a number of gaps in our knowledge of the events leading up to the attack. For example, it remains unclear how the Korean flight crew could have strayed so far off course and within Soviet airspace. It is not entirely certain whether the pilots of the Soviet interceptors knew that the Korean aircraft was a civilian airliner, although some evidence suggests that they did. The extent of involvement in the incident by Soviet ground controllers and higher authorities in Moscow is also unclear. However, it is clear beyond any doubt that Soviet aircraft did move into close proximity before firing at the airliner and that the attack was carried out in disregard for the loss of life that resulted. By any recognized standards of international law and conduct, the Soviet attack must be regarded as deliberate and unjustified.

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Moreover, the Soviets have sidestepped our diplomatic efforts to elicit an explanation of the incident. As you know, Larry Eagleburger called in Soviet Chargé Sokolov this morning to demand an explanation. This afternoon Sokolov telephoned Rick Burt to convey a "personal message" from Gromyko to me that acknowledges Soviet interception of the airliner but not a Soviet role in its destruction. I instructed Rick to inform Sokolov that Gromyko's response was totally inadequate and to reiterate our insistence on a satisfactory explanation of the affair. We have issued a public statement to this effect.

As you know, CINCPAC is already conducting a search and rescue mission in the area where the aircraft appears to have gone down. We plan to request access to Soviet territorial waters to facilitate this search, and to pave the way for possible salvage operations later on.

#### Elements of a U.S. Response

As you know, we have formed an interagency task force to examine the various aspects of the case, and to consider different responses that the U.S. and other concerned nations could take. The U.S. response must involve both steps in our bilateral relationship and a far-reaching effort to build and sustain a strong international response. We have thus far identified the following general areas for action.

##### A. Bilateral Steps

1. We have already notified the Soviets that the U.S. will not move forward with the planned extension of the bilateral agreement on cooperation in Transportation. This agreement provides for cooperation in various areas of transportation technology, including civil aviation safety and high-speed water-borne transport.

2. We will have to consider urgently what impact this incident should have on my planned meeting with Gromyko at Madrid. I intend to go forward with the meeting and to use it as a vehicle for conveying to the Soviets at Politburo level our strong revulsion at their actions and our determination to respond vigorously.

3. We are in contact with a number of prominent Americans who are planning to travel to the USSR in the near future, including Congressmen Gray, Boxer, and Solarz. We are not actively discouraging their travel, but are recommending that, if they feel they must go ahead with their trips, they convey their views on this incident to the Soviets in the strongest terms.

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4. We are instructing our delegation to the international communications conference in Soviet Central Asia this week to spotlight this incident in what they say, and to refuse all Soviet social invitations.

5. We are examining a number of other options for steps across the gamut of our bilateral relations, including in the economic area. For instance, we might consider reviewing all outstanding equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry, while pressing our allies to undertake similar steps.

#### B. Multilateral Initiatives

1. We have called for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council and will use this forum to condemn the Soviet attack in the strongest possible terms and seek a resolution calling for a special international investigation. In particular, we intend to use the Council debate to expose Soviet efforts to evade responsibility for the attack by including in the U.S. statement verbatim excerpts from the communications of Soviet pilots who fired the missiles. We will be pressing other nations to join with us in issuing condemnatory statements both in the Council debate and outside it.

2. We are urgently considering steps to organize and support international action against Soviet civil aviation interests, particularly Aeroflot international operations and flights by third-country airlines to the Soviet Union. For example, we could seek immediate allied and third-country agreement to refuse to accept Aeroflot flight plans for a specified period. We would pursue actions of this kind within organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, but much work will also have to be done in bilateral consultations with other nations. In this connection, we are studying ways to exploit the building condemnation of the Soviet attack by private organizations, such as the International Pilots Association.

3. We have looked at the possibility of bringing a case before the International Court of Justice, but this procedure would be time-consuming at best, and probably inconclusive.

#### C. Public Diplomacy

1. The statements already issued by you and me put us in the correct position of condemning in strongest terms the Soviet attack, while calling on them to explain it if they can. By contrast, the weak and evasive Soviet statements issued thus far will only fuel international skepticism of whatever line Moscow may ultimately adopt to "explain" its actions.

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2. We have already approached our European and Japanese allies to urge that they issue similar condemnatory statements. The British have already made a strong statement, and we will continue pressing others to follow suit.

3. We will be developing on an urgent basis a public diplomacy strategy to exploit this incident. As we implement this strategy, we must recognize that U.S. leadership will be essential. However, we will want to avoid repetition of the "Olympic Boycott" syndrome in which the U.S. role overshadowed that of other nations and private interests. Instead, the U.S. should encourage initiatives by others and adopt a supporting and facilitating role where possible and appropriate.

I believe that, taken together, these steps put us on the right track in developing the U.S. response to the Soviet attack. We will be constantly reevaluating and exploring new possibilities in the days and weeks ahead, and offering recommendations for your review.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

September 2, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: KAL Flight: Options Paper for Today's NSC  
Meeting

Attached is an options paper with recommendations for  
action for use at today's NSC meeting on the KAL incident.

*For* *William McKinley*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1991  
By *m72* NARA, Date *8/30/99*

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Near-Term Actions on Civil Aviation

At today's NSC meeting, we should consider concrete measures to register our condemnation of the Soviet attack on the Korean Air Lines aircraft and to impose a real cost on the Soviets. To maximize the cost and impose it quickly, we should concentrate on steps that can most efficiently exploit international outrage and generate multilateral solidarity. The world's attention is focussed on Soviet use of unprovoked force against peaceful air travellers.

Thus, we believe it important that our measures be concentrated in the civil aviation area and fully reflect the international outrage this incident has evoked. We need to spark international penalization of this egregious act without lending credibility to the inevitable Soviet claim that we are using the incident to freeze East-West relations even further. By sticking to the humanitarian and air safety aspects, in other words, we can avoid sacrificing the unity of outrage that presently exists. We think the following package of measures strikes the right balance.

1. We should seek immediate agreement by as many countries as possible to refuse to accept flight plans for Aeroflot for a minimum period of 30-60 days or until the Soviets have provided a satisfactory response to the international community. This would have the immediate advantage of registering a broad international condemnation of the Soviet action, but within a specific time frame so that it would be acceptable within the international community. Critical to the success of this effort will be securing the cooperation of the Canadians (since Montreal is the only remaining Aeroflot destination north of the Rio Grande), the Japanese, the Koreans, and several European countries. We would begin by diplomatic approaches to these critical countries and expand the effort, assuming we have a reasonable chance of success.

2. We should seek to suspend non-safety related ongoing discussions between the USSR and other national civil aviation bodies with a view to interrupting such arrangements as route awards, requests for the waiver of landing fees, etc. This measure, which would be raised with other governments in connection with step one, might have considerable impact on Soviet plans to expand their civil aviation operations worldwide, but could be acceptable to many in the international community, since it would not affect current operations once the steps taken under option #1 were terminated.

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3. Boycott. The Air Line Pilots' Association (ALPA) has already communicated with Andropov, Dobrynin, and ICAO, and is considering steps to implement an international boycott aimed at halting Aeroflot service outside the USSR and international airline service to Moscow as well. In addition, airlines may wish to join this effort. Other American labor leaders as well as foreign pilots' groups may be contemplating similar steps.

We will be meeting with these groups to learn more about their intentions, which could well serve to emphasize the level of international reaction.

4. Initiate procedures to censure the USSR at a special meeting of the ICAO Council next week. The President of the ICAO Council is attempting to arrange an urgent meeting of the Council, at which we will seek an ICAO investigation of events leading to the destruction of the KAL flight. That meeting will probably occur early next week. We may wish to ask the UN Security Council to reinforce this request. Our subsequent tactics will depend on developments in both fora.

5. Strong Reaffirmation of Existing Sanction. We would make a strong public reaffirmation that our present suspension of all regularly-scheduled Aeroflot service to this country remains the policy of this Administration and we have no plans to alter it. U.S. reactions to the shootdown showed that much of the public is not aware of this sanction, which has been very keenly felt by the Soviets. There has been pressure building to lift this sanction so that the reaffirmation would further underscore our abhorrence of this particular Soviet action.

6. Claims. Under international law, the U.S. would be entitled to make a claim against the Soviet Union for the wrongful death of our citizens. Korea and other affected countries would also have this right. There is precedent for making such a claim for compensation and for demanding that they take all appropriate measures to prevent a recurrence, inform us concerning those measures and punish all persons responsible for the incident. We will prepare such a claim against the Soviets, to be conveyed through diplomatic channels, and discuss the matter with the Koreans with a view to including any claim they may wish us to present on their behalf.

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7. Cancel interline ticketing arrangements with Aeroflot.  
At present, Aeroflot has arrangements to write tickets for travel on other airlines. If this and the attendant appearance of Aeroflot flights in other airline computers were cancelled, this would present the Soviets with serious impediments to selling tickets for travel into and outside the USSR. We will investigate the feasibility under U.S. domestic law of requiring our airlines to cancel these arrangements and the willingness of other countries to join us in similar steps.

We also considered a review of all outstanding U.S., Allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry. On balance, we think this would get in the way of achieving the more immediate steps above and might even jeopardize the safety of international aviation operations by cutting sales of necessary safety-related equipment to the USSR.

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