

AGENDA

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP
CHEMICAL WEAPONS MODERNIZATION

25 January 1983

Room 3E1074 Pentagon

1500-1615

LA -
CW

1500-1510 Review of Developments Dr. Gold

1510-1600 Review of Issues and Papers

Threat	CIA
Arms Control	State
Defensive Posture	JCS
Munition Degradation	Army
Deep Strike Requirement	Air Force
Alliance Issues	State

1600-1610 Review of Actions

Arms Control Research	State/OSD
Public Affairs Program	LA/OSD/NSC
Field Trips	Army
Demil Sites	ACDA/OSD

1610-1615 Discussion of Alternatives Dr. Gold

Note change in

K R I S



MACDONALD
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

To : The CW Arms Control Working Group
From : EUR/RPM - John Hawes
Subject : Draft paper on "Working with the Allies on CW
Modernization"

Attached for your consideration is EUR's first draft of the paper requested by the CW IG on the above subject.

I presume the CW working group will wish to discuss this paper at a future meeting. Any preliminary comments are of course welcome, and should be addressed to Tom Ochiltree, EUR/RPM, Rm. 6227, X20710

DISTRIBUTION:

CIA - Ms. Barbara Mattas
OMB - Mr. Joseph Cambell
NSC - Mr. Sven Kraemer
OSD/ISP - Mr. Mich McDonald
JCS - Col Charles Bay
ACDA - Dr. Robert Mikulak
INR - Mr. Gary Crocker
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IO - Mr. Jack Martin
S/P - Col John Pappageorge
PM/TMP - Col. James Leonard

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WORKING WITH THE ALLIES ON CW MODERNIZATION ISSUES

Issue:

What approach to the Allies will maximize support for US programs and policies?

Essential Factors:

This paper looks primarily at two questions related to the modernization issue:

-- Can the Alliance contribute positively at present or in the near term to achieving our CW program objectives?

-- How can the CW question best be addressed with the Allies at the appropriate time?

U.S. Policy on CW Modernization:

The Administration's commitment to CW modernization for purposes of deterrence and retaliation, and as an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate an effective CW prohibition, is set forth in NSDD-18 of January 4, 1982.

When the modernization decision was announced, the Allies were informed that while resumption of CW production was a matter for unilateral U.S. decision, there would be no decision to deploy the weapons in Europe without close consultation with the countries involved. In addition, we pointed out to the Allies that actual production would not begin for some time, and that the U.S. had no current plans to seek deployment in Europe.

This position was taken out of awareness that in the current political climate in Europe, it would be extremely difficult to obtain agreement by Allied governments to deployment.

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DECL: OADR

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NLS Feb-124/1 #89

BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/9/00

CW Modernization and Allied Public Opinion:

Allied leaders responded to the announcement of our modernization program by publicly agreeing with us that production as such was exclusively a U.S. decision on which it would be inappropriate for Allied governments to take a position. By doing so, they sought to avoid adding another controversial arms modernization issue to the public tensions over INF modernization.

Separation of the production and deployment issues has so far kept public debate on CW modernization in Europe at a relatively low level compared with that on INF. The CW issue could become explosive, however, if it were posed to them in terms of a request for Allied support for deployments.

In the present situation, the peace movement and anti-CW members of the media and parliamentarians can only concentrate their fire on the CW stockpiles already in Europe. In doing so, they obviously hope to exploit the greater public sensitivity to security issues and to recruit followers against other US activities, particularly the INF deployments. This is particularly the case in the FRG, the only European member of the Alliance where CW is currently stored. There, with increasing energy in the past year, anti-CW activists have argued that present U.S. stockpiles put the civilian population at risk of a lethal peacetime accident or mass casualties in the event of wartime use; that U.S. willingness to subject German civilians to this risk is evidence that NATO serves exclusively American interests; and that the relationship which the U.S. seeks to maintain with the FRG is one of an occupying power.

The great mass of the German public does not at present accept this line of argumentation. And currently the CW issue cannot compare with INF as a focus of public debate. Nevertheless, the fact that a branch organization of the German Trade Union Federation would -- with the support of the parent organization -- file suit before the Constitutional Court challenging the legality of CW storage in the FRG suggests that potential concern regarding CW extends well into the mainstream of German politics.

Allied governments have told us in NATO and elsewhere that they fear any discussion of CW modernization would "overload the circuits" and perhaps be a decisive factor in preventing INF deployments. In addition, the German government has argued that even failure by the West to formulate a convincing CW arms control policy could lead to a public CW controversy in the FRG

which could have a serious negative impact on prospects for INF deployment in that country. Apart from the overall impact on the INF debate, there is the more immediate concern in Germany with the potential implications of any security debate for the upcoming national parliamentary elections in March, where the Greens and the opposition SPD can be expected to harp on "peace" issues.

CW Modernization In NATO

It has long been recognized that NATO's CW policy and posture is deficient. At the same time, there is a long history of unsuccessful efforts to rectify this situation. In 1979 and 1980 the Military Committee sought to raise to the political level what it saw as the incongruity between the statement in MC 14/3 that NATO should have a limited CW retaliatory capability, and the fact that capability outside the two US corps areas is virtually nil. In 1979 the Chairman of the Military Committee asked the SYG to raise the problem with the DPC, but his letter was acknowledged without action. The request was repeated to the SYG in 1980; Luns raised it informally with Permreps who decided not to consider CW policy.

In May, 1982, the Military Committee agreed that the International Military Staff (IMS) should study Chemical warfare policy issues. The Military Committee invited all delegations to participate, but only the US, UK and FRG did so. In September, the completed study was forwarded to the SYG with a request for political guidance from the DPC.

The questions on which the Military Committee requested DPC guidance were:

-- Are nuclear weapons a suitable or adequate deterrent to the use of chemical weapons?

-- Should NATO continue to rely solely on the U.S. for its CW retaliatory capability?

-- If a CW retaliatory capability is needed in all regions of NATO, how should it be achieved?

-- What kind of release procedure is needed?

-- What should be NATO's public information policy if the Alliance decides to improve CW retaliatory capabilities?

The questions appeared designed to provoke a political debate, and it was agreed in Washington that raising them at

present would lead to a sterile confrontation, which if leaked would harden political opposition to eventual deployment of binaries. After extensive corridor discussion between civilian and military authorities, it was agreed that the MC/IMS study should be sent to the Executive Working Group (DCMs of the respective delegations to NATO) for further refinement; the EWG was not given a mandate to elaborate political guidance on the study. The EWG will probably be given the report some time in early 1983.

As with other aspects of Alliance posture, France represents something of an anomaly in regard to CW, first of all by virtue of the fact that it possesses its own chemical weapons -- a policy which reflects a national consensus in favor of strong, independent French defensive capability. This has not, however, been of assistance in bringing the rest of the Alliance to support CW modernization.

The French CW capability, like other aspects of the French deterrent, is implicitly an increment to the total deterrent capability of the Alliance. On the other hand, there is no chance of France integrating its CW capability into Alliance military planning, and indeed it is unlikely that France would even accept any discussion by the Alliance of the role its CW capability could play in defense of the West.

CW Modernization and CW Arms Control

For our Allies, particularly the Germans, it presently appears that an active U.S. policy on CW arms control must be a prerequisite of any eventual deployment of new CW in Europe. Without such a policy, Allied governments have made clear, merely raising the modernization issue, let alone trying to sell the need for CW deployments to their publics, would be prohibitively difficult. This is particularly the case with the FRG, which as mentioned above believes that at least an appearance of Western action on CW arms control is necessary to contain the debate on binaries and CW stockpiles. In addition, the FRG and other Allies have indicated to us they see political advantages to be gained from a Western push for progress on CW arms control in terms of Western interests and relations with the Third World.

While at least an appearance of forthcomingness on CW arms control would make it easier for the Allies to swallow deployment, we must be careful not to get locked into another "dual track decision" a la INF. This suggests that it might be best to frame eventual requests for deployment in a bilateral context, rather than in NATO. On the other hand, obtaining

some kind of NATO agreement on the need to strengthen the Alliance's CW capability -- perhaps through the IMS study -- could make our justification of such a bilateral request more convincing. In any case, it is premature to talk about deployments with the Allies at this time.

As for the course the West should follow in pursuing CW arms control, while the Allies support the idea of an effectively verifiable treaty banning CW production, stockpiling, etc., to varying degrees they may be less stringent than we in what they would be prepared to accept in the end in the way of verification. Lying behind this is a desire to conclude an agreement in the near-term and the belief that the Soviet Union will never accept really tough on-site inspection measures. At the same time, however, they recognize the importance we must attach to verification issues. This may be why the December 10 NAC communique, in calling for action at the CD on CW arms control, underlined the need for on-site inspection.

CW Passive Defense:

Allied response to an LTDP calling for increased passive defense measures has been mixed, although in general one can say that as a means of countering the Soviet CW threat the Allies are less interested in such measures than they are in arms control. On the other hand, passive defense is politically far easier for them to handle than the question of the Alliance's retaliatory capability.

Projection of Allied plans for the provision to all personnel of protective CW equipment to NATO standards indicates that many nations will not complete this LTDP measure by the mid-term. Luxembourg, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom have done so, and other nations should do likewise by 1985. Belgium and Germany will not meet the requirement of a second NBC suit by then, however, and in the Netherlands only the air force meets the requirement. The situation is far more serious on the flanks. In the Northern Region, Denmark will only initiate equipment procurement in 1983, and Norway does not expect full implementation before 1987. The earliest projection of fulfillment of the individual equipment requirement in the Southern Region is 1988 for Italy, and Greece will probably have some deficiencies until at least that year, with progress likely to be at least somewhat dependent on external aid. Portugal and Turkey report that implementation of this measure will only be possible through external aid.

With regard to the provision of special equipment intended for aircrews only, the United Kingdom has fully met this

requirement, the Netherlands expects implementation by 1983, and Canada by 1985. Germany will achieve implementation for army aircrews by 1986 and full implementation by 1987. Full implementation will be achieved by Belgium in 1987. (The United States Air Force has met this requirement but the United States Army, Navy and Marine aircrews do not have the special equipment.) In the Northern Region, Denmark plans an interim system from 1987, and although Norway has 150 sets of protective equipment on order as a short term solution, it has yet to decide on long-term policy. Of the nations in the Southern Region, Italy has yet to confirm an equipment program and acknowledges that it will have no equipment before 1984. Greece and Portugal have not indicated their intentions regarding special NBC equipment for aircrews. Turkey requires Allied assistance.

So far as the protection of NATO military headquarters against chemical warfare is concerned, progress has been made by all major NATO commanders. However, success here will still depend on nations ensuring that all their personnel serving at NATO military headquarters are equipped and trained to agreed NATO standards.

Elements of An Approach

I. Raising the issue of binary deployment with the Allies at this time would be unproductive and potentially damaging. In addition, it would not be advisable to seek Allied commentary on our unilateral production decision: any Allied position on this subject would be at best equivocal, and harm, rather than help us on the Hill.

--In the year of INF IOCs, the CW issue will be particularly acute, virtually guaranteeing negative results for CW itself, and potentially making more difficult deployment of P-II and GLCM.

--A U.S. request for deployment would force the Allies to turn it down -- thus taking a position which would be difficult to reverse at a latter time. This refusal would strengthen the hand of Congressional opponents of binary production.

--The CW issue could be further exploited by the Greens and the rest of the opposition in the FRG in the anticipated March elections, with potential long term damage to US and alliance interests.

II. Once the INF IOC is successfully achieved, we may expect a diminution of "peace" pressure, and a climate more propitious to rational debate of security issues -- including possible CW deployment.

-- It will be difficult for the Soviets and their Allies to keep public attention focused on INF once it is a fait accompli.

-- This may result in a lowering of the temperature in the arms control debate in general, which will increase chances for eventual binary deployment in Europe.

-- "Peace" issues have waxed and waned in Europe over the years. Strong opposition in the FRG to joining NATO was followed by a period of widespread acceptance of NATO membership. The unilateral disarmament movement of the UK in the 1960's went into a period of quiescence prior to its current revival.

III. To the extent possible, the deployment issue, when posed, should be divided between an overall Alliance position on strategy, and a specific national responsibility for weapons systems. The Alliance as such should not be asked to make a deployment decision.

--It is doubtful that some countries of the Alliance would be prepared to support CW modernization at any point, on the basis of any arguments.

--While potential deployment countries, especially the FRG, would want an Alliance cover for modernization, they may have learned some of the difficulties of such arrangements from the INF experience, and thus be prepared to work with a more flexible pragmatic split between Alliance and national responsibilities.

--Handling requests for deployment in a bilateral context will make it easier for us to resist possible pressure for a CW "dual track decision" specifically linking deployment to arms control efforts.

--Deployment will be more politically palatable to Allied governments, and saleable to Allied publics, if presented at least initially as replacement on a one-for-one basis of existing CW stocks.

IV. In the interim, we should push improvement in the Alliance CW defensive posture, and build a record of pursuit of CW arms control.

--Defensive capability is far short of our goals. While even achievement of goals would not be an adequate response in itself to Soviet CW posture, it is intrinsically important and provides a politically acceptable way to address the CW issue in the Alliance and to publicize the Soviet threat.

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--We must pursue an active approach to the CD this winter to convince Allied governments of our sincere desire for a CW ban; at some future date this could provide a justification for seeking binary deployment, as a necessary step in an overall policy.

Drafted:EUR/RPM:THOchiltree
WANG 5495A

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