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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

8 February 1983

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Interagency Working Group on Chemical Weapons Modernization, 25 January 1983 (U)

(U) The Interagency Working Group on Chemical Weapons Modernization met at 1500 hours, 25 January 1983. The attendance list is at Tab A. The agenda is at Tab B.

(S) Dr. Ted Gold, Chairman, assisted by the members, reviewed developments since the previous meeting of 15 December 1982.

- (U) PBD 618 and 618R established binary program funding for FY 83-84.

- (S) The pressure containment of the Bigeye bomb is a technical problem which may delay the Bigeye program. An outside panel of experts has been formed to help review the program. If it is determined that a FY 84 procurement schedule cannot be met, the FY 83 reprogramming will not be requested, and we instead shall attempt to place the needed facility funds into the FY 84 budget in lieu of the Bigeye procurement funds. The first meeting of the expert panel is 26-27 Jan 83, and their recommendations will be available by April.

- (U) The status of the current stockpile is the key issue in justifying 155mm binary projectile procurement. A blue ribbon panel is being formed to review the stockpile status.

- (U) The GAO has also announced that it will be reviewing the stockpile status.

- (U) The national academy of science is reviewing the safety of the stockpile with respect to peacetime operations and the priority of demilitarization.

- (S) Representative Bethune and House Foreign Affairs staffer, Elisa Harris, have been visiting US chemical storage and demilitarization sites (Ms Harris was also in Europe in December). Representative Bethune plans to visit Johnston Island and CINCPAC in February, and House Foreign Affairs Staff members plan to visit Tooele in that time frame.

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- (U) Representative Purcell, HAC, is reported to be planning hearings on CW use 17 February 1983.

- (S) Arms control initiatives are proceeding. Blair Murray reported on the results of the 14 January meeting of the CBW Arms Control IG. Unanimous agreement was reached to table in the CD the US Detailed Views on the Contents of a Chemical Weapons Ban and support initiation of CD negotiations, with suitable caveats to ensure effort on the critical issues of verification and compliance. These decisions are to be kept secret until after the Vice President speaks at Geneva.

(U) The issue papers were discussed as follows:

- (U) Threat. The paper was provided at the meeting (Tab C). Mr. Carson requested comments as soon as possible. The issue was raised if we should attempt to obtain Congressional hearings as to the impact of Soviet use on military operations, and comments are requested for further review at the next meeting.

- (U) Arms Control. It will be available shortly and will cover the history of CBW arms control as well as current initiatives. The Army provided data on the stockpile history (Tab D), and was requested to obtain stockpile data for 1969, recognizing some estimations may have to be made. Col Robinson suggested the Fulbright hearings on the Geneva Protocol in the early 1970's as a good reference on CW arms control history.

- (U) Defensive Posture. The JCS paper had been previously distributed. JCS was requested to use specific data on degradation, rather than only percent figures. That is, for example, give the time required to turn around a sortie with and without CW protective measures, or give the number of sorties expected with and without CW protective measures. Recommendation was also made to obtain tactical commanders' evaluations as well as study results. Recommendation was given to include mention of the psychological effects of actual CW operations.

- (U) Munition Degradation. Information on current stockpile assessment was provided (Tab E).

- (U) Deep Strike Requirements. The AF paper had been previously distributed. Recommendations were made to more explicitly detail what deep targets would be hit by chemicals and why the attacks would have military value. Suggestion was made to use analysis of effects of chemical strike on friendly deep targets as a basis for specifying the value of strikes on enemy deep targets.

- (U) Alliance Issues. The State Department draft paper had been previously distributed. The paper was unanimously felt to concentrate too much on the non-controversial issue of

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raising the deployment issue. No one wishes to do that, and it is not necessary to discuss the matter at great length. Instead, the issues which should be addressed in the paper should include allied defensive posture and allied retaliatory requirements with recommendations of proposed actions.

(U) A brief review of ongoing actions recommended by the group was held.

- (U) Arms Control Research. Col Brown of ACDA is working on requirements paper. Dr. Gold is working on a letter for SECDEF to volunteer to assist.

- (U) Public Affairs Program is awaiting action.


- (U) Legislative Affairs working group has only identified an Army representative. Dr. Gold requested LTC Dowling to send a memo to the other Services requesting assistance.

- (U) Field trips for Congressional leaders are being held by the Army. It was recommended tht key DOD officials, particularly the General Officers, who will be testifying on this subject, also go on field trips.

(U) Demil Sites. The idea to have CD delegates visit US sites has been discussed, and State and ACDA are still investigating how best to do this. In general, the idea is believed to be a good one.

(S) Col Robinson announced his departure to a new assignment at DARCOM. He presented a concept of deterrence to be based on avoiding contamination by: (1) recognizing enemy indicators of use; (2) destroying with conventional weapons key enemy resources needed to be able to employ chemicals; and (3) detecting chemical attacks and avoiding contamination from rainout of persistent agent.

(U) The next meeting is scheduled for 16 February, 1500 hours in Room 3E1074 of the Pentagon. Revised drafts of all the papers are to be reviewed at that time.


GEORGE H. CONNOR, JR.
Colonel, USA
Special Assistant for
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OATSD(AE)

5 Attachments
as stated

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INTERAGENCY -WORKING GROUP
ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS MODERNIZATION

25 January 1983

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>PHONE</u>
Dr. Ted Gold	DATSD(CM)	695-5448
Col George Connor	ODATSD(CM)	697-3098
B/G Horace L. Russell	NSC	395-5024
Col Harold L. Brown, II	ACDA/MA	632-2069
Marianne Winston	ACDA/MA	632-9579
Blair L. Murray	State/PM	632-4814/15
Michael G. Macdonald	OSD/ISP	695-5819
James O. Carson	CIA/DCI/NIC	351-7105
Capt J.F. Doyle	OPNAV (954)	697-1462
LTC Dean E. Dowling	OSD(LA)	697-9369
Peter R. Sommer	NSC	395-3116
Col Bob Robinson	DAMO-NC	697-1516
Maj George R. Jackson	USAF/XOXFM	695-7050
Col Jerry Cox	USAF/XOXFM	695-7051
LTC Ira M. Click	OJCS	695-0322

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TAB A

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AGENDA

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP
CHEMICAL WEAPONS MODERNIZATION

25 January 1983

Room 3E1074 Pentagon
1500-1615

1500-1510	Review of Developments	Dr. Gold
1510-1600	Review of Issues and Papers	
	Threat	CIA
	Arms Control	State
	Defensive Posture	JCS
	Munition Degradation	Army
	Deep Strike Requirement	Air Force
	Alliance Issues	State
1600-1610	Review of Actions	
	Arms Control Research	State/OSD
	Public Affairs Program	LA/OSD/NSC
	Field Trips	Army
	Demil Sites	ACDA/OSD
1610-1615	Discussion of Alternatives	Dr. Gold

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WORKING PAPER

THE THREAT (U)

1. The major chemical warfare threat to the United States is posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. An increasing number of countries however possess or are acquiring a chemical warfare capability and the prospect that chemical weapons may be encountered in regions critical to US interests other than Europe is growing. (S)

The Warsaw Pact Threat

2. The USSR operates on the premise that lethal chemical agents are likely to be used in a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; accordingly, the Soviets and the NSWP countries possess the resources to wage chemical warfare on a large scale. The Soviets would be likely to use chemical weapons - in conjunction with conventional and nuclear weapons - once the nuclear threshold had been crossed. In addition, there is at least a substantial risk of the Soviets making first use of chemical weapons in a nonnuclear conflict. (S)

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3. General Soviet doctrine for the employment of chemical weapons indicates that, once the decision to use them was taken, the Pact would attempt to achieve surprise and to wage chemical warfare on a massive scale. As in nuclear warfare, the element of surprise would offer distinct advantages, especially to the first user, against unprotected troops or even protected forces whose training and equipment were deficient. Coupled with surprise, massive use of chemical weapons could facilitate penetration of NATO defenses and permit the high rates of advance which the Soviets believe necessary for victory in a short war.

(S)

4. A broad based research and development program has existed since World War II, and the Soviets remain in the forefront of CW technical knowledge. Basic research in chemical warfare agents and protection is conducted at closed, classified military research institutions as well as at civilian institutes of the Academy of Science, and Academy of Medical Science. The Soviet CW Test program at its 400 km² chemical warfare testing area, Shikhany Central Chemical Proving Grounds continues to be very active. A major construction project of 13 buildings in and adjunctant to the operational support complex is currently underway. CW related testing continued in the field test areas during the past year. (S)

5. The Soviet Union has the capability to produce a variety of chemical agents and munitions. Although no industrial facilities in Warsaw Pact countries have been confirmed as currently producing toxic CW agents, several are suspected and are being monitored by the Intelligence Community. HUMINT and PHOTINT have supported the identification of a chemical agent production plant at Shikhany Central Chemical Proving grounds. In addition two other plants in the Soviet Union have similar or identical production facilities. We believe that the Soviets are manufacturing sufficient bulk chemical agents to maintain reserves and replace agents and munitions consumed by training and deterioration. The quantities involved in maintaining a sufficient stockpile are relatively small, and a continuous large-scale production program would not be necessary. (S)

6. The Soviet Union has a chemical weapons stockpile. While we cannot provide a reliable estimate of it, we do believe that they have adequate levels of operational stocks, including nerve agents such as GB (sarin) and thickened GD (soman), as well as older types of agents such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and the mustard-lewisite mixture. Confirmation of the use of incapacitating chemical

agents and lethal mycotoxins by Soviet forces in Afghanistan and by Vietnamese and Lao troops under Soviet supervision in Laos and Kampuchea also provides compelling evidence of the existence of these agents and toxins in the Soviet chemical inventory. (S)

7. Existing Soviet weapon systems capable of delivering toxic CW agents would enable the USSR or its Pact allies to attack targets in Europe in almost any tactical situation or weather. The means of delivery include bulk-fill artillery and mortar shells; multiple rail- and tube-launched rockets; chemical mines; warheads for free rockets over ground (FROGs), tactical ballistic missiles, and possibly cruise missiles; aerial bombs and possibly spray tanks; and naval munitions. The variety of Pact agents and delivery systems provides a capability both for attacking protected and unprotected troops and for producing a residual contamination on equipment and terrain. Ground force systems capable of delivering chemical agents would enable Pact forces to cover large areas of the combat zone from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) to at least 300 km beyond. Air dropped munitions provide the potential for large-scale strikes against NATO, especially against nuclear delivery systems. Naval weapon systems provide a chemical warfare capability against ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage sites, and amphibious landing operations. (S)

8. Chemical agents and munitions are believed to be stored throughout the Soviet Union in a network of storage depots during peacetime. Eleven installations are prime candidates for storage of CW agents/munitions, although there are many more depots that store chemical defense equipment. There also is some evidence that CW agents/munitions are stocked at selected conventional ammunition and naval depots. In addition, small amounts of agents for chemical defense training are held by chemical defense units throughout the Soviet Union. (S)

Warsaw Pact Chemical Defense Program

9. Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces have been provided with extensive chemical protection. CBR protective equipment supplied to the individual soldier is judged to be adequate to protect him in a contaminated environment from hours to days, depending on the nature and concentration of the contaminating agent. The Soviets have developed protective shelters equipped with ventilation systems providing air from which both toxic particulate matter and toxic vapors is removed. Air purification systems are being installed on armored personnel carriers, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and numerous vans. The Soviets have

several types of decontamination trucks that can be used for decontamination of personnel, terrain, and equipment, including clothing and weapons. Agent detector kits and automatic alarms are available in adequate quantities and are capable of rapidly detecting all standard lethal Western and Soviet CW agents. (S)

10. The Soviets and their Pact allies maintain CBR defense units in all military services. In the ground forces, separate chemical defense units are organic to troop formations from front down through regimental level. Most air regiments and airfields also have CBR defense units. Large naval surface combatants have a full-time chemical officer and a small number of chemical defense specialists. Naval shore bases have a chemical services chief and a small chemical defense unit. (S)

11. CBR training for Warsaw Pact military personnel is pervasive and well integrated at all levels. General troop training is designed to familiarize personnel with the effects of CBR weapons and with the use of individual protective equipment and unit reconnaissance and decontamination equipment. Field training often includes a simulated CBR phase in which troops must perform their duties in full protective gear. Large CBR defense

exercises, conducted semiannually, cover all aspects of CBR defense and apparently involve the use of small amounts of live chemical agents as well as training/simulated agents. Chemical defense units conduct annual training at specially designated training sites. (S)

The Chemical Threat in Other Regions.

12. The chemical warfare threat is not be confined solely to a NATO/WP confrontation. Other countries, in regions of vital interest to the United States, are developing or have a chemical weapons capability. Many more countries are acquiring a protective capability, probably in response to real or projected threats. The possibility that the United States could become involved in a localized conflict in which the protagonists possess chemical weapons is thus increasing. (S)

13. In the Middle East, largely unconfirmed reports indicate that several countries have chemical weapon programs.

- Israel has at least a small stockpile and may produce CW agents and munitions. Various reporting has indicated that the stockpile may include nerve agents. (S NF)

- Egypt has a small chemical weapons stockpile. Egypt did use chemical agents against Yemen in the 1960s, but we do not know if these stocks were from the USSR or of Egyptian manufacture. (S NF)

- Iraq maintains a small arsenal of mustard munitions and is attempting to develop nerve agent munitions. Iraq is attempting to improve its offensive CW capability including an independent CW production capability, but with foreign assistance. (S NF)

- Syria has allegedly received nerve agent munitions from the USSR. The Syrians appear to be a long way from being able to manufacture CW agents or munitions. (S NF)

- Libya allegedly received unidentified quantities of nerve agent CW shells from the USSR. Some reporting indicates Libya has a program to develop an independent capability through third party assistance. (S NF)

- The Ethiopians or the Soviets allegedly have used CW agents supplied by the Soviets against the Eritreans. (S NF)

14. In the far east, Vietnamese and Laotian forces have used chemical agents and toxins against resistance forces in Laos and Kampuchea and several other countries are believed to have chemical weapon programs:

- China (PRC) has a small though not militarily significant offensive CW capability at this time. The Chinese do recognize the usefulness of toxic chemical weapons on the battlefield, but sufficient information is not available to estimate the quantities or types of chemical agents or munitions available. (S NF)
- Taiwan has an aggressive, high priority program for developing its offensive and defensive CW capabilities. Taiwan has produced and probably weaponized mustard agent. It is producing some binary nerve agent stocks and is attempting to develop a CW binary warhead. (S NF)
- North Korea reportedly stores and produces WWI-type CW agents, but such reports are unsubstantiated. (S NF)

15. The proliferation of CW capability is responsible for and is aided by a developing international market in chemical warfare equipment and training. Numerous free

world and WP countries have sold CW defensive equipment and training. A growing number of countries have the capability to sell chemical munitions or the necessary components to manufacture chemical munitions. (S NF)

History.

16. The history of CW use or non-use in this century provides some insight into the military utility of chemical weapons. There have been numerous allegations of CW use in this century. The use of lethal chemical agents has occurred in at least six instances. (U)

17. Germany, France, British Empire, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Russia, and the United States employed CW agents during WWI. The French initially used tear gas weapons which prompted the Germans to realize their tactical value and subsequently initiate use of lethal chemical agents at Ypres in April 1914. Germany hoped to break the stalemate of trench warfare and their initial effort against unprotected soldiers demonstrated the value of the chemical weapon, but the Germans failed to exploit the advantage and soon afterwards all belligerents possessed the capability. (U)

18. Italy employed vesicants and asphyxiants against the Ethiopians in 1935-36. Initially the use was probably experimental; continuing use provided a tactical advantage against unprotected Ethiopians. Tactically aircraft sprayed mustard was used to protect flanks and channalized the enemy, to disrupt communication centers, and to demoralize enemy forces. Contributing factors included unexpected staff resistance from the Ethiopians and the Italians desire to conclude their invasion as rapidly as possible. (U)

19. Japan employed chemical agents against the Chinese during 1937-1945. The campaign offered the Japanese the opportunity to evaluate the utility of chemical weapons and to have them accepted within their military establishment. They were selectively used against the most important objectives in order to conserve manpower. The Chinese were almost completely unprotected against the CW attacks. (U)

20. Egypt reportedly employed CW weapons in the Yemeni Civil War during 1963-1967. Three theories for their use are: neutralization of enemy strong posts in mountain caves which were invulnerable to conventional attack, as an effective means for coercing tribesmen, and as a proving grounds for experimental CW weapons. (U)

21. Chemical weapons have been employed in Southeast Asia. Vietnamese forces have employed CW weapons against Democratic Kampuchean troops and Khmer villages since at least 1978. Laos and Vietnamese forces, under direct Soviet supervision, have employed chemical agents against H'Mong resisting government control since at least 1976. (U)

22. Soviet forces have employed CW weapons against Mujahidin resistance forces and Afghan villages since December 1979. The rationale for their use is unknown, but they are being employed against people unprotected and unable to retaliate and it is safe to assume that there is some advantage to their use. (U)

23. The most significant case of non-use occurred in WW II. At the end of the war the allies and the AXIS powers possessed considerable quantities of chemical munitions yet they were not intentionally employed by either side. The SIPRI study concluded that the two dominate reasons for the non-use were "fear of enemy retaliation in kind" and the "military establishments were unconvinced that gas was a generally valuable weapon". (U)