

Third Country Nuclear Forces and Arms Control

As in the previous SALT negotiations, third country nuclear forces have been raised by the Soviets as an issue in the INF negotiations. It is the assumption of this paper that the US will wish to continue firmly to reject Soviet demands for compensation for UK and French forces.

Previous Negotiations

The Soviets attempted to have nuclear weapons in Europe included in both SALT I and SALT II. They sought inclusion of both US "Forward Based Systems" and the British and French nuclear forces. In both cases, they finally agreed to treaties that did not directly limit or compensate them for either FBS or the independent deterrent forces.

o In the Interim Offensive Agreement (SALT I) the Soviets sought to include UK and French systems. The US proposed limiting Soviet IRBMs. Both finally dropped those positions. The Soviets did, however, table a unilateral statement saying that they would consider that they had a right to increase their SSBNs to the extent that the United Kingdom and France increased their SSBN forces. The United States rejected the unilateral statement. In what was seen as a separate move in the talks, however, Kissinger informed the Soviets that 1) we did not plan to build up to the ceiling on SSBNs that the draft IOA gave us and 2) that we would not count toward the Soviet SSBN total the 22 Golf-class diesel submarines in the Soviet force. Some commentators have suggested that these two statements were partial compensation or at least made it possible for the Soviets to accept the American rejection of their unilateral statement on third countries. Officially, the US maintained that these were not to be viewed as compensation, although the Soviets may have taken them as such.

o In SALT II the Soviets continued to press for inclusion of French and British systems, but fell off that insistence at Vladivostok. The US had argued that the third country systems were more comparable to the unlimited Soviet IRBMs (SS-4/5/20) than to US strategic systems. In the subsequent detailed negotiations of SALT II, the Soviets said that they planned to use SALT III to deal with the "FBS" and third country issues. The Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Further Negotiations...contains vague wording allowing either side to raise new issues in SALT III. The US, however, did not

commit to limitations on "FBS" or third country systems in SALT III. Now that the Soviets have agreed to negotiate limits on their IRBMs, they may think the US past position means we should agree to compensate them for British and French systems in INF.

#### Current Soviet Position

The Soviet's position in INF was originally that the US should not deploy any new INF systems because there is an existing balance between NATO systems on the one hand, and Soviet systems on the other. They assert that additional US deployments would have to be met with further Soviet deployments. The Soviet offer to reduce Soviet missiles to the level of the UK and France, implicitly conceded that an imbalance exists in INF missiles in Europe. However, the current Soviet position is that they will reduce their missiles to the level of the British and French missiles only if the US agrees not to deploy.

The Soviets apparently see the Chinese missile threat as one that they would rather not deal with in the INF talks. Their "Europe only" position excludes the Chinese missiles and their hint of separate Asian nuclear talks appears to be little more than a propoganda counter to the US global position in the INF talks.

#### Best US Responses

The United States has made several arguments in refutation of the Soviet claim for compensation. None is totally convincing to publics; indeed, one of the main problems is that the US rationale is so complex. These arguments include:

o Not Ours: The most straight-forward US argument is that the British and French systems are not ours and we have no right to negotiate about them. The Soviets note in response that the US is willing in MBFR to include French numbers within the count of forces on the NATO side and to pledge to adjust for any increases in French forces in order to maintain the common ceiling level, even though France is not a part of MBFR. The Soviets have also claimed that we effectively control or strongly influence deployment and use of third country systems. In response, the US has noted that the British systems, though pledged to NATO, revert to total national control; French systems are under national control also. Moreover, both countries have explicitly stated that their systems are not to be included in any way in INF. Therefore, we do not control them and should not compensate for them.

o Strategic Systems: We have claimed in INF that the French and British SLBMs are dissimilar to the missiles being discussed in INF and more similar to US and Soviet, strategic systems. The Soviets have not, however, accepted that INF should only address land based missiles and have rejected this US argument against compensation.

o US-Soviet Equality: As superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union must be treated as equals. This means that the US and the Soviet Union must have equal rights and obligations in any agreement. Compensation would involve numerical inequality of obligations.

o Soviet Problem: A rhetorical point that we have made is that it is not our fault if the Soviets have made enemies of France, China, and the United Kingdom. The line of argument continues that the US should not have to pay for this Soviet problem, which the Soviets should handle directly with the countries concerned. A corollary argument is that the Soviets are using this device to seek strategic superiority by claiming the right to have as many nuclear forces as the rest of the world combined.

o Soviets Have Other Forces: We have also noted that the Soviets are looking at this category of weapon systems in isolation. The Soviets maintain a larger force of conventional weapons, nuclear capable aircraft, and SRINF missiles than does NATO, including France, in addition to their large strategic forces. Thus, the Soviets have no legitimate claim to deploying LRINF missiles to "counter" British and French forces.

#### Other Arguments Used by NATO

The British, Germans, and French have added three more arguments:

o Relative Importance. The British have argued that historically, the UK forces at one point amounted to some 8% of the total world nuclear arsenals. Since this peak, it has dropped to 3%; even with full UK planned modernization, and with START-limits, it would only return to its previous 8% total.

o Threat to Britain and France. The French have recently turned the Soviet definition of "strategic" to their advantage. They argue that if a balance between Soviet and French systems is to be drawn, all Soviet systems capable of striking French territory should be taken into account. Soviet systems not limited by either INF or START, or only indirectly limited, are so numerous that there is a massive superiority in the Soviet favor.

o Third Country Weapons Not Coupling. The Germans (and the US) have made the point that the PII and GLCM are intended chiefly to couple the US strategic deterrent to NATO's theater nuclear weapon systems. British and French systems cannot perform that coupling mission.

Recommendations to the IG

Both the British and French governments have indicated that in the context of significant reductions in US and Soviet strategic arsenals, they would review their position. If it were decided that it could be helpful to the INF negotiations, we could encourage the British and French to be more explicit.

WANG # 1867P