

File: LA  
Chem Weapons

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

December 30, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR PETER R. SOMMER  
ROBERT M. KIMMITT  
ROBERT H. LILAC

FROM:

DEBORAH L. ROCHE *DUR*

SUBJECT:

Legislative Strategy Meeting on Chemical  
Weapons (CW) Modernization

On 15 December 1982, Horace Russell and I attended a Defense chaired legislative strategy session on chemical weapons. Representatives from JCS, State, ACDA, CIA, and the military services were present also.

As you know, the SIG/DP agreed on November 16, 1982 to seek funding for facility construction for Bigeye Bomb production in FY 83 and bomb production in FY 84. This session focused on how to achieve this goal.

The group agreed that presentations to Members of Congress and staffers will play a crucial role in gaining Congressional approval of this plan. Ted Gold noted that work on both written reports and oral presentations should begin now in six major areas with drafts due by mid- to late-January 1983. These areas are:

- (1) Intelligence - CIA/DIA will prepare a paper emphasizing Soviet use in order to better describe the threat.
- (2) Arms Control - State/ACDA must stress the U.S. commitment to arms control as well as frankly assess the problems involved with CW production.
- (3) Retaliatory Capability - JCS will focus on the idea that a defensive capability alone is not enough; the U.S. must develop an effective retaliatory capability as well.
- (4) Munitions Procurement - JCS/Army will present evidence, possibly supplemented by outside, "blue ribbon" panel verification, that our stockpiles have deteriorated seriously and no longer represent an effective deterrent by themselves.

*K S I*  
*R*

- (5) Deep Strike Capability - JCS/Air Force/Navy/Army will emphasize that we currently do not have a capability beyond artillery range and assess whether the Bigeye or other alternatives could provide deep strike capability.
- (6) Allied Involvement - State is preparing a study which discusses how and when to coordinate with our allies.

Other points raised at the meeting include:

- White House legislative people (Duberstein) should be involved early on at a low level.
- We must find committee leaders to handle the reprogramming efforts. Representative Dickinson and Senator Warner are supportive; Appropriations Committees are a different story.
- Field trips to CW sites for Members of Congress and staffers are useful.
- If possible, Defense should sponsor more research in chemical biological warfare arms control.
- We should be frank about problems in the Bigeye program.
- Academic support and other "expert" opinion should be utilized as much as possible to write articles, lobby Congress, etc.
- We must be careful not to overstate our case and assure that senior Administration officials give coordinated presentations.

The attached minutes provide additional information on public and Congressional reaction to chemical weapons.

Attachment



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REMOVED UPON REMOVAL OF  
ALL OTHER ENCLOSURES

6/18/49

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

29 December 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Interagency Working Group on Chemical Weapons  
Modernization

Attached are the minutes of the Interagency Working Group meeting on Chemical Weapons Modernization held 15 December 1982. The next meeting is tentatively planned for 12 January 1982.

*George H. Connor, Jr., Major, USAF*  
for GEORGE H. CONNOR, JR.  
COLONEL, USA  
Special Assistant for Chemical  
Matters (OATSD(AE))

Attachment  
as stated (C)

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

Col Horace Russell, NSC	Dr. DeLauer (info)
Mr. Joseph Campbell, OMB	Dr. Wade (info)
Ms. Blair Murray, State	Dr. Wagner (info)
Mr. Bob Mikulak, ACDA	Dr. Gold
BG(P) William E. Klein, JCS	Mr. Peter Sommer, NSC
COL Bobby Robinson, Army	LTC Click, JCS
CAPT John Doyle, Navy	
Col Jerry Cox, USAF	
LtCol Dean Dowling, OASD/LA	
Mr. Mike Macdonald, OUSD(P)	
Mr. James Carson, CIA	

UPON REMOVAL THIS DOCUMENT  
BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D C 20301

29 December 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Interagency Working Group on Chemical Weapons Modernization, 15 December 1982

The Interagency Working Group on Chemical Weapons Modernization met at 1500 hours, 15 December 1982. The attendance list is attached at Tab A.

Dr. Ted Gold, Chairman, reviewed the Senior Interagency Group Defense Policy decision concerning chemical weapons modernization and informed the group of the DoD budgetary decisions to implement the SIG DP decision. He also outlined a general approach to working with Congress that will involve reaching most, if not all, members as well as the leadership, building upon the significant areas of agreement and focusing upon the few issues of contention (Tab B). It was agreed that briefing and written material be prepared addressing several specific issues. The written material should be in both an unclassified, and, when appropriate, a classified version, and would be incorporated in an overall report to Congress. The material should connect to last year's report to Congress, emphasize new information or circumstances, and be responsive to questions and concerns raised in the Congressional debates (Tab C). The issues and the lead organization responsible for preparation are:

- 1. The Soviet CBW threat. CIA  
Include use in Asia.
- 2. ARMS Control. State/ACDA  
U.S. strategy, prospects, opportunities, challenges.
- 3. Why a purely defensive posture is inadequate. Include evidence of performance degradation and impact upon military operations, cite relevant exercises, studies, etc. JCS
- 4. Evidence of munition physical deterioration. Need to provide convincing case and eliminate this as a debating point for opponents. Army

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT M1359 #6

Classified by: ATSD(AE)  
Review on: 29Dec88

BY dmf, NARA, DATE 11/10/05


- 5. Need for deep strike capability. Air Force  
 Why current munitions inadequate. with other  
 Impact of lack of capability. Services  
 Will Bigeye provide needed  
 improvement? Address questions  
 of deliverability, reliability,  
 agent effectiveness.
  
- 6. Alliance Issues. State  
 Be prepared to address wide  
 range of concerns and criticisms.

Initial draft of the papers should be distributed to members of the task group by January 20.

Suggestions for additional action offered at the meeting included:

- Establishing a process involving State, ACDA, DoD and the intelligence community to support and direct CW arms control research and studies (OSD offered support. State will provide plan).
- Establish a Public Affairs program (OSD action).
- Organize field trip for Congressmen and staff (Army will take lead).
- Invite delegates from CD to visit U.S. demilitarization site (ACDA/DoD).

The next meeting will be held in late January unless some issue arises that requires an earlier meeting.

  
 GEORGE H. CONNOR, Jr.  
 Colonel, USA  
 Special Assistant for  
 Chemical Matters  
 (OATSD(AE))

Attachments  
as stated (U)

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP  
CHEMICAL WEAPONS MODERNIZATION  
15 December 1982

NAME	ORGANIZATION	PHONE
Dr. Ted Gold	DATSD(AE) (CM)	695-5448
Col George Connor	OATSD(AE) (CM)	697-3098
LTC Ira M. Click	OJCS (J-5)	695-0322
CAPT Jack Doyle	OPNAV (DP-954)	697-1462
Col Bob Robinson	Army DAMO-NC	697-1516
Col Harold L. Brown, II	ACDA	632-2069
LTC Frank W. Thornhill, Jr.	Army ODCSOPS	697-3535
Major George R. Jackson	AF/XOXFM	695-7050
Col J. Cox	AF/XOXFM	695-9024
Mr. Michael G. Macdonald	OASD/ISP	695-5819
Blair L. Murray	State Dept/PM	632-4814/15

~~REDACTED~~

---

Major Alan G. Smith	OJCS	695-0322
Deborah Roche for Peter Sommer	NSC	395-5112
Col Horace Russell	NSC	395-5024
LTC Dean Dowling	OASD/LA	697-2365

Released  
DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
EAB 124/1 # 94  
dlb Date 6/9/00

## U.S. CHEMICAL WARFARE POLICY ISSUES

### COMMON GROUND

WE BELIEVE THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITHIN THE US ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- AN AVERSION TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AS COMMON WITHIN THE MILITARY AS WITHOUT
- A GENUINE DESIRE FOR A COMPLETE AND VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS THE PREFERRED SOLUTION TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL WARFARE.
- RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S FORMIDIBLE CAPABILITY TO WAGE CHEMICAL WARFARE AND THE NEED TO DETER THEM FROM USING THIS CAPABILITY.
- LITTLE OR NO DESIRE TO INVOKE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO DETER CHEMICAL WARFARE
- SUPPORT OF PROGRAM TO IMPROVE U.S. DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES TO INCLUDE MORE AND BETTER TRAINING, NEW EQUIPMENT
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT DEFENSIVE MEASURES ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO DENY MILITARY ADVANTAGE TO AGGRESSOR AND THEREFORE SOME RETALIATORY CAPABILITY IS REQUIRED TO DETER.
- SUPPORT OF CONTINUING EXISTING U.S. POLICY OF ABSOLUTELY NO BIOLOGICAL OR TOXIN WEAPONS AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ONLY FOR RETALIATION

### AREAS OF MAJOR DISAGREEMENT ARE:

- ADEQUACY OF CURRENT CHEMICAL STOCKPILE.
- ARMS CONTROL TACTICS - MULTILATERAL VERSUS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.
- ISSUES OF TIMING; E.G., DON'T PROCEED UNTIL ARMS CONTROL HAS CHANCE OR WHILE WORLD ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON SOVIET USE IN ASIA.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: House Debate on Binary Procurement of 22 July 82

The following arguments were made by opponents of binary procurement. :

1. Current Stockpile is Adequate

- A. There is 30 days of supply
- B. The quality and quantity is adequate
- C. All 155mm and 8" munitions are in condition code A.
- D. Retaliatory doctrine not well defined.
- E. Very safe stockpile.
  - (1) Adm Davis "safety record of our current stockpile -- is excellent".
  - (2) Senior Senator from Utah (Sen Garn) "...No accident of any kind...".
- F. Military commanders do not like chemical weapons.
- G. Saul Hormats (13/12 years in charge of whole program) "current stockpile contains enough serviceable munitions to force the Soviets to suit up."
- H. Substantial stockpiles prepositioned in Western Europe today.
- I. Our stockpile capable of blanketing 9,000 square miles with dosages sufficient to kill every human being on earth.
- J. U.S. chemical stockpile list shows serviceable stockpiles very impressive.



K. Hormats and Admiral Davies make question of adequate offensive capability, a flat-out draw.

L. Less than 1% of stockpile is unusable. Only 33-155mm are unserviceable.

M. Refurbishing program has increased number of weapons, not decreased.

N. Council For a Livable World: "stockpile for 45 days of continuous chemical warfare in Europe."

2. Binary munitions are not militarily effective nor more effective than unitary.

A. They are not field tested and reliability uncertain, (e.g., TAB) (Bigeye is unreliable), no dynamic testing.

(1) 20-30 percent of 155 would be duds.

(2) 50% of Bigeye would be duds.

(3) 155mm would puff up in air.

B. They present logistical problems.

(1) Worthless if cannot be deployed in Europe.

C. Mr. Hormats "... of unknown reliability and of questionable military usefulness. ... Also inferior to our current chemical weapons in that our current unitary shells are not just nerve gas shells but rather HE-chemical shells."

D. Group of professional chemists, biochemists, and biologists familiar with the technology, including some Nobel winners.

(1) binary agents untested;

(2) by their nature, less predictable and more restricted in use than single agent;

(3) may have as yet undefined carcinogenic and other adverse medical effects.

E. Saul Hormats - Bigeye bombs are extremely unreliable and untested

(1) If don't gage mixing right, deterioration occurs before it hits the ground.

(2) Smell of sulfur gives warning.

F. Improved protection would emphasize NATO's essentially defensive purposes.

G. Distinct sound signature.

### 3. Cost of binary not warranted

A. \$550 per binary versus \$30 to upgrade existing projectile.

B. Binary funds detract from chemical defense funds.

C. \$6-10B, \$6-12B to be spent over the years on binary.

D. Is production more important than Navy's need for new ships? For retention of service NCO's?

E. Money needed for other social programs.

### 4. Foreign Policy Implications

A. Allies in Europe reject binary.

(1) West Germany SPD

(2) Dutch and Norwegian Governments

(3) Bill in British parliament all reject storage of chemical weapons.

B. Forward Deployment Necessary

C. Lose credibility gained thru non-production.

D. Dr. Messelson said our overkill capability is detrimental to NATO allies.

- E. NATO assembly resolution Nov 80 "Proposals to deploy--strong public reaction."
- F. Production returns to dark days when deadly gas hovered over the battlefields of Europe.
- 5. Failure to comply with Senate report of conference of Jan 81 to report on Europe's views on the subject.
- 6. Binary undermines Arms Control.
  - A. USSR tabled CW arms control proposal.
    - (1) Significant changes in verification position.
    - (2) Rejection would cause arms race.
  - B. This administration ended bilateral negotiations and refuses to reinitiate them.
  - C. Production would abandon past policy to eliminate CW weapons and would end 13 years of restraint.
  - D. Binaries stimulate proliferation.
  - E. BWC requires effort to obtain CW weapon ban.
  - F. Production demonstrates that CW and BW weapons are cheap, effective weapons.
  - G. Mr. Hormate "... production...will not deter...will make their use in warfare more likely by prompting the Soviets to expand their chemical weapons production."
  - H. Binary production makes verification more difficult.
    - (1) binary plants look different than other commercial chemical plants to satellite;
    - (2) mandatory on-site inspections provide no way to ensure inspection of every chemical plant.

- I. Provocative first step toward a new chemical arms race.
7. Moral/psychological advantage lost thru production.
- A. Ghastly and indiscriminate killer.
  - B. Victims are primarily civilian, particularly children.
  - C. Stimulate Arms Race.
  - D. Loses third world support.
  - E. Loses advantages of Soviet use of yellow rain.
  - F. Response to President's certification of need.
    - (1) Der Spiegel "escalated the arms race."
    - (2) Radio France - Inter "logic of death."
    - (3) Amsterdam's Trouw "Europe--likely theater."
    - (4) Helsinki's Uusi Suomi
    - (5) Stuttgarter Zeitung
8. Bad timing for production.
- A. Yellow rain psychological effectiveness lost judgement.
  - B. Allied plate full and need help from allies on more important issues.
    - (1) Poland
    - (2) Soviet trade limitations.
    - (3) Other trade issues.

- C. Soviet CW arms control proposal.
  - D. Would make Europe more vulnerable to disengagement pressure.
9. Destruction of unitary munitions for binary is smoke screen.
- A. Junk could be used to comply.
  - B. BZ weapon could be used that was already planned to be used.
  - C. Big distinction between "serviceable artillery" and "munitions."
10. Prestige of Messers Zablocki and Bethune.
11. Production would be example of reacting reflexively to Soviet military decision and accepting unforeseen moral and geopolitical consequences which present Soviet military policies imply.