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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*LA -
Chemical Weapons*

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ACTION

November 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *B*
FROM: HORACE L. RUSSELL *HR*
SUBJECT: SIG/DP - Chemical Programs

You are scheduled to attend the SIG/DP meeting, chaired by Richard DeLauer, in the Situation Room Tuesday, November 16, at 10:00 a.m. As you recall, there was confusion during the September-October time period on the strategy to implement the President's decision for binary chemical weapons and the actual priority of the binary program.

The issue paper for the SIG is at Tab A. As the paper indicates, Option 2 is the most prudent. It would allow facility construction for the Bigeye (Bomb) production capability to get underway this fiscal year, to be followed by bomb production in 1984. Option 3, which delays everything until 1984, in my judgment, is a non-starter and should not be supported. Option 1, which would fund production and facilities in FY 83, represents our initial effort which squeaked by the Senate with only four votes and was soundly denied by over 30 votes in the House.

Talking points for your use are at Tab B

RECOMMENDATION

Support Option 2.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Issue Paper
Tab B Talking Points

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BY NOI NARA, DATE 1/16/07

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SIG DP Meeting, 16 November 1982

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/10/05

ISSUE: (U) To develop the Administration strategy for implementing the President's decision to achieve a credible chemical retaliatory/deterrent capability.

FACTS:

- (U) U.S. and allied CW capabilities are critically weak compared to the Soviet Union, creating an incentive to use chemical weapons. In particular, the existing chemical stockpile is inadequate to deter chemical warfare. The major deficiency is the lack of an effective capability to deliver persistent agent beyond artillery range.
- (S) NSDD-18 directs that we simultaneously pursue the eventual goal of a verifiable, comprehensive CW ban and the modernization of the U.S. CW deterrent retaliatory capability with both short and long range systems.
- (U) Arms control efforts for CW, including current discussions in the UN Committee on Disarmament, remains stalemated over verification issues, and the Soviets have little incentive for desiring progress unless modernization continues.
- (U) On 8 Feb 82, the President certified to Congress that "production of lethal binary chemical munitions is essential to the national interest," citing their need for both deterrence and arms control leverage.
- (U) Production facilities for short range 155mm binary projectile are under construction. There are no other chemical munition production or fill facilities under construction or in operable status.
- (U) The President's FY 83 Budget contained \$73M for initiation of binary production (\$18M for 155mm projectiles, \$12M for Bigeye bomb) and Bigeye bomb facilitization (\$24M for equipment and \$18M for construction). Congress did not authorize the \$54M requested for binary munitions and Bigeye equipment, and only appropriated \$8M construction funds for environmental work and site preparation which provides no facility capability. The funds were denied "without prejudice."
- (U) The Chairman, HASC, wrote the SECSTATE that the Joint Conferees on the FY83 Authorization Act agreed "that if the President believes the authorization of funds for binary weapons production in FY 1983 to be of sufficiently high priority, the committees will give consideration to a reprogramming action."
- (U) The Senate MILCON Appropriation Report states that if reprogramming is initiated to proceed with the production program during FY 83, "then a similar request for military construction appropriation funding should be made to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees."

DISCUSSION: (U) The basic issue to be resolved is whether to attempt to obtain FY 83 funds to support binary production or defer until FY 84. In either event, gaining Congressional approval will not be easy and opposition to resumption of chemical weapons production will be active. Progress toward stockpile modernization will require direct involvement of the highest level Administration people (e.g., SECSTATE, SECDEF, National Security Advisor), as well as communication from the President to key Congressional members.

(U) The program came very close to being approved in the FY 83 budget process and the debate reflected considerable consensus by the Administration and the Congress on the fundamentals of appropriate U.S. CW policy. This consensus included recognition (1) of a Soviet threat, (2) that a comprehensive, verifiable arms agreement is the ultimate goal, and (3) that defense alone is insufficient to deter and therefore a retaliatory capability is needed. In addition, participants on both sides dislike chemical weapons; are unwilling to rely on the threat of a nuclear response to deter CW; and support U.S. policy of no biological or toxin weapons and use of chemical weapons only in retaliation. Congressional opposition to proceeding with new weapons focused on:

- Skepticism that the current chemical stockpile is inadequate.
- Belief that Allies would not support deployment of binaries.
- Skepticism over the Administration's commitment to a chemical weapons ban.
- Concern over the timing of the production decision--give arms control a chance (a course followed unsuccessfully in the recent past)--and a U.S. decision now would deflect world attention from Soviet/surrogate use of chemical and toxin agents.

(U) With regard to the stockpile and issues regarding our allies, we need to sharpen and focus the facts and arguments available to support our claims and point out the arms control leverage offered by the modernization issue.

(C) To date, the U.S. has opposed the initiation of "negotiations" in the CD as premature, maintaining that before such negotiations can begin, substantial progress must be reached on key verification/compliance arrangements--issues on which the Soviets continue to be intransigent. The U.S. position on verification and compliance issues has broad support. However, there are doubts among some Congressmen, Allies, and the international community about whether the U.S. is genuinely interested in a CW treaty, while the Soviets gained political advantage by tabling basic provisions for a CW treaty at the very time our binary modernization efforts for FY 83 were being debated in the House. The document represented little new, and the Soviets have not expanded on it in the CD. A more aggressive leadership posture and information program on CW arms control would better enable the U.S. to dispel doubts about U.S. seriousness.

(E) CW modernization, particularly production and deployment, is an extremely sensitive issue within the Alliance. The Allies repeatedly stress that production is a U.S. decision, but the overall CW issue must be handled with the utmost care. The Allies further believe the West must devote (or perhaps be seen as devoting) a large measure of time and energy to concluding a comprehensive ban on CW. However, they are not adequately addressing the question of what actions--whether related to defense or retaliation--are required to assure deterrence until conclusion of a complete and verifiable CW prohibition. Whether it is necessary now to get the Allies to do so--and, if so, how--are questions which merit further study.

OPTIONS:

(E) ACTIONS COMMON TO ALL OPTIONS: There are two actions which could further the ultimate goal of eliminating the CW threat: adopting a more aggressive leadership posture in CW arms control efforts; and assess when and how to work closer with the Allies to improve CW preparedness. These are important for their own sake, and they also could assist in resolving doubts in Congress about supporting the Administration's total CW deterrence program. In addition to these actions, an interagency legislative working group, established to plan and coordinate presentations to Congress, would enhance the likelihood of success.

OPTION 1: (U) Fund Production and Facilities in FY 83. This option would keep the program on schedule (production capability in 1985) and would send a very strong signal of the Administration's continued resolve to eliminate the CW threat. It would require over \$50 million if Bigeye only is considered and about \$70 million if the 155mm projectile were also included. Each of the potential funding alternatives--reprogramming, Appropriations Bill Amendment, or supplemental--has difficulties. Identifying offsets to reprogram \$50-70 million is nontrivial and, even if accomplished, unanimous approval of the four committees for a reprogramming action which includes munition procurement is unlikely. An Appropriation Bill Amendment might more easily be defended through floor debate, but insufficient time exists to prepare support unless the FY 83 Bill is deferred for the next Congress. However, one would not expect Congressional favor toward any request for additional 83 funds (either through the amendment or supplemental route, even if requested).

OPTION 2: (U) Fund facilities in FY 83 - Delay production to FY 84. This approach would indicate resolve to improve our deterrent capability and the absence of actual munitions procurement should increase the likelihood of FY 83 support from key Congressional leaders. It would require about half the funds needed for Option 1. This option results in almost a year's slip in Bigeye production capability from Option 1, with little improvement (possibly a few months) in the schedule (although with decreased risks) projected for Option 3. As with Option 1, failure to achieve Congressional approval could continue a snowball of failure rolling towards FY 84 budget considerations. This option could be structured more easily than Option 1 as a reprogramming action which would be viewed as

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complying with Congressional Invitations. Other advantages/disadvantages of funding alternatives are the same as Option 1.

OPTION 3: (U) Delay until FY 84. This option would provide the longest time for favorable events and action in support of the program and would require only a few million in FY 83 reprogramming (in R&D) to have the possibility of Bigeye production in 1986. However, this option shows least urgency and least resolve to remedy the current CW asymmetry, and provides no immediate arms control leverage. The lack of responsiveness to the opportunities left open by Congress could alienate supporters. Since about \$30 million for additional Bigeye equipment is programmed for FY 84 in all options, this option would increase the risk of delays in Congressional approval and execution by requiring production and total Bigeye facilitation funding all in one fiscal year. Further delay of binary production decision past FY 84 into 1984--a Presidential election year--could jeopardize the total program.

DECISIONS: (U) The commitment to modernization of the chemical deterrent retaliatory capability is reaffirmed by the following decisions:

_____ Option 1: (U) Fund production and facilities in FY 83.

_____ Option 2: (U) Fund facilities in FY 83, production in FY 84.

_____ Option 3: (U) Delay until FY 84.

Yes _____ No _____ (U) Establish working group to plan and coordinate presentation of the above indicated funding option to Congress.

Yes _____ No _____ (C) Establish interdepartmental working group to assess when and how to work closer with Allies to improve chemical preparedness.

Yes _____ No _____ (C) Encourage more vigorous pursuit of established CBW arms control objectives and pursue a more aggressive leadership posture in CW arms control discussions.

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SUBJECT: Summary of Senior Interagency Group-Defense Policy Meeting on Chemical Weapons Modernization

(S) The SIG/DP on CW Modernization (attendance list attached) met in the White House Situation Room on Tuesday, 16 November 1982 to examine alternatives for implementing the President's decision to reestablish a credible CW deterrent posture. The NSC principal reported that the President, while recognizing the political problems, continues to support the need to modernize because of the threat posed by Soviet capabilities.

(S) The SIG examined three program alternatives in light of Congressional action which eliminated, without prejudice, funds for both production capability and weapon procurement from the FY 83 budget. These alternatives are: (1) to request Congressional approval to use FY 83 funds for both facilitization and munition procurement; (2) to request the use of FY 83 funds for Bigeye facilitization only and defer munition procurement to FY 84; or, (3) to defer both facilitization and munition procurement to FY 84. The SIG unanimously endorsed the second alternative as the prudent course of action given the need to press ahead on this program while accounting for fiscal constraints. It was further agreed that there is little hope of achieving the objective with the "lame duck" Congress and instead efforts should be directed toward the new Congress. The SIG directed that an interagency working group be established, led by DoD, to plan and coordinate presentations of the modernization program to Congress.

(S) The SIG also: (1) endorsed the need to develop and implement a strategy to more vigorously pursue CBW arms control objectives; and, (2) directed an examination to be conducted by the existing CW arms control IG, of CW alliance issues, in particular, the questions of when and how the United States could work closer with our Allies to improve chemical warfare deterrence. State will take the lead for these two actions.

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NLS M/1359 #11

BY snf, NARA, DATE 11/10/85

Classified by: ATSD(AE)
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