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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY

17 November 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Group (IG) Meeting on Southwest
Asia Military Issues *RS*

The Department of Defense will convene an Interdepartmental
Group (IG) meeting on Tuesday, 24 November 1981, 1515-1700, in
the Pentagon, Room 2E687A, chaired by Mr. Bing West, ASD(ISA).

Agenda items are as follows:

1. Near-term HNS Requirements for RDJTF.
2. Priorities in Approaching Regional States for
HNS.

Attached is the paper to be discussed at the meeting.

Attachment
a/s

DISTRIBUTION:

State, Mrs. Sheila Lopez, Rm 7214, 632-5804
NSC, Mrs. Carol Cleveland, OEOB, Rm 376A, 395-3044
CIA, [REDACTED]
OJCS, Lt Col Edward Bucknell, Rm 2E976, 697-7857

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WORKING PAPERS

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SWA Country-Specific Host Nation Support Strategies

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(S) The requirement to deploy and sustain the RDJTF in the Persian Gulf area makes it vitally important that regional states provide us with access to adequate facilities, POL, water, materials handling equipment and other host nation support (HNS). The JCS have developed estimates of HNS requirements to support a 3-1/3 division, 4-Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) RDF in the area. These requirements have been identified for Egypt, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. Country-specific HNS strategies that examine relevant political views and defense relationships of the potential host governments and recommend tailored, country-specific strategies to open bilateral discussions aimed at obtaining HNS commitments have also been developed.

(S) Our analysis had determined that approaches should be made to Oman and Egypt to begin discussions on HNS umbrella agreements in the context of bilateral meetings scheduled in the next few months. After establishment of a US-Saudi Joint Military Commission (JMC), which should be initiated soon in that the AWACS/F-15 enhancement package has survived Congressional veto, we should approach the Saudis to resume joint cooperation talks in which HNS discussions would be injected. Actual HNS discussions with Bahrain and the UAE should follow Saudi agreement to encourage both countries to assist in providing contingent support to the RDJTF. Neither Turkey nor Pakistan are expected to be ready to discuss HNS for US forces in SWA in the next year, although the strategies aimed at those countries are designed to educate their leaders of the mutual benefits that would be derived from cooperation in the region. No strategy was developed for Iran.

(S) Despite the complex political obstacles that must be overcome in obtaining the HNS commitments necessary for support of the RDJTF, there is no question that we must urgently initiate those possible actions that will ultimately achieve the level of burden-sharing required to meet the threats to key states in the region.

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SWA Country-Specific Host Nation Support Strategies

OVERVIEW

General.

(S) Host Nation Support (HNS) is an active part of US defense strategy in NATO and the Far East, where we can rely on significant support from well-developed, industrialized societies with relatively stable governments, where agreements can be negotiated, signed and depended on. In these contexts, HNS consists of written bilateral agreements obligating the host countries to provide specific types of support (e.g., facilities, labor, transportation) for US forces, either in peacetime, in an armed conflict, or both. This HNS enables the US to concentrate on combat structure, modernization and readiness and meets early wartime support requirements that we cannot now satisfy. It does require an acceptance of the risk of a changing political climate which might render the support agreement invalid and the loss of some flexibility since the support is tied to specific locations.

(S) The development of a defense strategy for Southwest Asia (SWA) has clearly recognized the need for adoption of burden-sharing with key states in the SWA region, similar to that incorporated in the HNS and other cost-sharing arrangements with our NATO and Far Eastern Allies. Because of the requirement to move men and materiel over long distances with limited strategic lift assets, it is vitally important that Persian Gulf and other regional states provide us with access to adequate rear, main and forward operating and support facilities, pre-stockage and distribution of POL and water and materials handling equipment (most important). In addition, indigenous support in areas of transportation, storage, utilities, medical support, and labor are also crucial to constructing a viable military strategy for the defense of the region. To the extent existing facilities are inadequate to support contingent requirements, "overbuilding" of those facilities by host governments, or by the US with their agreement, is part of the HNS strategy to ensure that airfields, fuel, water and power distribution systems, and transportation and port reception networks are adequate to support US contingency requirements.

(S) The JCS have developed estimates of HNS requirements to support the near-term (through 1982) deployment, employment and support of a 3 1/3 - division, 4 - Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) RDF to the Persian Gulf area (Encl B). These HNS requirements fall in seven countries: Egypt, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Turkey,

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and Pakistan (requirements were also identified for Iran but are not considered here because of the nature of current bilateral relations). These HNS requirements were derived in part from operational planning and are sufficiently generic to form the basis for near-term bilateral negotiations with potential host governments for obtaining HNS for most SWA contingencies.

(S) No formal HNS agreements have been achieved and no negotiations for HNS are ongoing, although significant HNS for the AWACS, KC-135 and communications elements presently deployed in Saudi Arabia is being provided by the Saudis on an informal basis. Historically, the Saudis have provided significant HNS (e.g., operating space, fuel, lubricants, quarters, messing and laundry services to US AWACS and associated elements) on those occasions when the Saudis have invited US forces into Saudi Arabia. Moreover, our access agreement with Oman and the Egyptian commitment to provide access to facilities in a crisis should facilitate discussions in these two countries aimed at obtaining HNS agreements.

Political-Military Attitudes of Potential Host Governments.

(S) Arab attitudes, with few exceptions, toward defense cooperation with the US are complicated and often contradictory. On one level, Arab leaders for reasons of their own survival must be sensitive to popular attitudes that run strongly against foreign intervention because of past experiences with colonial rule and a general xenophobia that is rooted in Arab nationalism and spurred by Islamic resurgence. Moreover, with very few exceptions, Arab attitudes are colored by their perception that the most immediate threat to their security comes from an expansionist Israel. Despite their anti-communist and anti-Soviet attitudes, and resultant fears, even the moderate Arab regimes are restrained from closer military relations with us by their perception of the unconditional identification of the US with a state which they consider to be a danger to their survival. The Arabs also fear involvement of their region in a confrontation between the two superpowers.

(S) On another level, moderate Arabs seem to realize that the US is the only power capable of effectively countering the activities of the Soviet Union and its surrogates. This recognition, however, is tempered by the divergence in view between many Arab leaders and the US concerning the degree and likelihood of threats posed by the Soviet Union. Most of the moderate Arab countries perceive Soviet influence in client states in the region as a more likely threat than a Soviet invasion of Iran. Their security concerns are focused principally at maintaining internal stability and against one or more regional powers.

They are also concerned that a close defense relationship with the US may exacerbate their internal or regional security problems. Against these lesser threats the Arab states believe that their

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defense relationships with the US should focus on acquiring modern armaments and training and not on the close contingency planning necessary for a combined defense against Soviet aggression. Thus, a preliminary requirement to achieving closer defense cooperation with most Arab leaders lies in convincing them of our mutual interests and benefits to be gained from a focus on the potential threat to them, the absolute need for contingency cooperation before the onset of a crisis, and the value of such efforts for deterrence. A clear presentation or review of the Soviet threat to regional and national stability should be made to key leaders in each country where it has not already been provided to heighten the perception of the need for contingency planning now. In some cases, we will want to tailor threat briefings of a follow-on nature. Additional threats posed by Soviet clients/surrogates should also be clearly presented.

(S) Although Turkey is concerned with recent events in SWA and the Soviet threat to western interests in the region, it is unwilling to commit itself in advance to cooperate in US efforts that encompass SWA contingencies. Turkey has made clear that its approval of proposed activities to meet SWA contingencies will require a NATO umbrella. As Turkey cannot now meet its NATO commitments, its total focus is on strengthening and modernizing the Turkish military. While Turkish defense modernization would automatically create a greater "threat in being" on the flank of Soviet aggression through northwest Iran, the Turks view a more specific focus on SWA or increased US presence in Turkey not related to NATO as creating greater risks to Turkish long-range security interests than benefits. We intend to pursue HNS discussions with the GOT in a NATO context following resolution of the collocated operating bases issue.

(S) Pakistan's policies of non-alignment and close ties with other Islamic nations are highly popular with the general population. The GOP will view US initiatives which it perceives could jeopardize its non-aligned status or places Pakistan out in front of its Islamic friends and benefactors, particularly Saudi Arabia, with caution. This posture might change should the Soviet threat to Pakistan through Afghanistan intensify. Over time, as our new security relationship with Pakistan takes tangible form, there is also a greater prospect for enhanced security cooperation with Islamabad.

Diplomatic Strategies for Obtaining HNS Commitments.

(S) Based on HNS requirements identified by the RDJTF and validated by the JCS, and recognizing that each candidate country has its own perspectives and propensities, tailored, country-specific diplomatic strategies are needed to open or continue a dialogue with appropriate countries with the view to obtaining HNS contingent commitments

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that can be factored realistically into SWA military planning. These strategies will reflect the current status of bilateral relations and understandings and, initially, may not necessarily involve HNS negotiations per se, but may focus on development of a security cooperation dialogue or process within which HNS could be pursued. In general, HNS agreements must start with understandings about contingency access to host nation facilities.

(S) Timing of diplomatic efforts with regional governments should not be subject to pro forma scheduling. At least initially, approaches on most HNS matters must be timed within the context not only of bilateral relations, but also of regional events and intra-regional relationships at a given time. Due to the urgent requirement for HNS, however, we must take the earliest opportunity to initiate discussions with host nations at various levels according to the state of bilateral relations. Of particular importance to RDJTF planning will be the development of interagency understanding on the likelihood of obtaining HNS commitments for the near term or beyond, the extent of the commitments we seek, and the timing for approaching potential host nations. In this regard, formal written HNS agreements with which the US has become familiar in its HNS negotiations with NATO allies probably cannot be achieved with many regional states. Based on a case-by-case assessment as our bilateral relationships develop, less formal (even verbal) commitments to provide contingent HNS may be the most that can be obtained.

(S) The most persuasive case for the host government commitment of HNS will be made on the basis of the mutual benefits that will result. If the regional states can be convinced by hard evidence that there are credible threats to their territorial integrity to which the US alone can adequately respond, then the negative perception of the RDJTF being a reaction force to protect only US interests could be resolved. We must convince regional leaders that our ability to respond quickly to their requests for military assistance will be enhanced by reducing the strategic lift requirements through bilateral HNS contingency planning. One way of describing the challenge in approaching regional states on this relatively new subject is "courtship". It must be recognized that HNS is only a part of a much broader security cooperation courtship.

(S) Although US security assistance programs with these SWA states is only one facet of the bilateral relations that will affect the likelihood that HNS requirements will be met, from the viewpoint of the potential host governments these programs and the degree to which the US is perceived as forthcoming in meeting defense equipment requirements are extremely significant as measures of US commitment and reliability. Notwithstanding the importance of strategy-oriented dialogues and US military presence and exercises in the region, one of the most important instruments at our disposal to influence positively and directly the likelihood of obtaining

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required HNS commitments are the many tools that fall under the umbrella of security assistance. Therefore, it is critical that the FY83 security assistance program, and those in the out-years, be governed at least in part by what these states perceive as their legitimate defense requirements.

(S) Publicity about our HNS planning and negotiations could be one of the most counter-productive facets of our undertaking. Regional fears of USG indiscipline in protecting the confidentiality of bilateral commitments will seriously constrain the likelihood of obtaining them, as well as limit the scope of the commitments that might be made. We need to assure each country of the confidentiality of HNS negotiations.

(U) The framework for developing near-term HNS requirements for the RDF is at Enclosure A. Specific HNS requirements and capabilities of potential host governments to meet those requirements are included at Enclosure B. Country-specific HNS strategies are presented at Enclosure C.

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